Source Memory Revealed Through Eye Movements and Pupil Dilation by Papesh, Megan H (Author) et al.
Source Memory Revealed Through Eye Movements and Pupil Dilation  
by 






A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  











Approved April 2012 by the 
Graduate Supervisory Committee:  
 
Stephen D. Goldinger, Chair 
Gene A. Brewer 
Erik D. Reichle 
Donald Homa 













ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY  
May 2012  
  i 
ABSTRACT  
   
Current theoretical debate, crossing the bounds of memory theory and mental 
imagery, surrounds the role of eye movements in successful encoding and 
retrieval. Although the eyes have been shown to revisit previously-viewed 
locations during retrieval, the functional role of these saccades is not known. 
Understanding the potential role of eye movements may help address classic 
questions in recognition memory. Specifically, are episodic traces rich and 
detailed, characterized by a single strength-driven recognition process, or are they 
better described by two separate processes, one for vague information and one for 
the retrieval of detail? Three experiments are reported, in which participants 
encoded audio-visual information while completing controlled patterns of eye 
movements. By presenting information in four sources (i.e., voices), assessments 
of specific and partial source memory were measured at retrieval. Across 
experiments, participants’ eye movements at test were manipulated. Experiment 1 
allowed free viewing, Experiment 2 required externally-cued fixations to 
previously-relevant (or irrelevant) screen locations, and Experiment 3 required 
externally-cued new or familiar oculomotor patterns to multiple screen locations 
in succession. Although eye movements were spontaneously reinstated when gaze 
was unconstrained during retrieval (Experiment 1), externally-cueing participants 
to re-engage in fixations or oculomotor patterns from encoding (Experiments 2 
and 3) did not enhance retrieval. Across all experiments, participants’ memories 
were well-described by signal-detection models of memory. Source retrieval was 
characterized by a continuous process, with evidence that source retrieval 
  ii 
occurred following item memory failures, and additional evidence that 
participants partially recollected source, in the absence of specific item retrieval. 
Pupillometry provided an unbiased metric by which to compute receiver operating 
characteristic (ROC) curves, which were consistently curvilinear (but linear in z-
space), supporting signal-detection predictions over those from dual-process 
theories. Implications for theoretical views of memory representations are 
discussed. 
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Source Memory Revealed Through Eye Movements and Pupil Dilation 
The nature and structure of recognition memory have been debated since 
Tulving (1983) introduced the term “episodic memory” to describe memory for 
everyday experiences. Episodic memories, however, are not always concrete and 
are often experienced as vague feelings of knowledge. For example, when 
shopping at the grocery store, you may run into work colleagues, old friends, 
family members, or a vaguely familiar clerk from a different store. You recognize 
most of these people with ease, accurately accessing your memory of each person 
and, more specifically, from where you know them. But memory is not always so 
specific; sometimes, as in Mandler’s (1980) famous example, we see our local 
butcher on the bus, and experience a feeling of familiarity that can range from 
vague (“I think I know that guy”) to strong (“Seriously – how do I know that 
guy?!”). Importantly, this experience is not necessarily resolved with recollected 
details; you cannot name the butcher, but know that you know him. Such apparent 
memory failures provide important anecdotal evidence about the everyday 
function of memory; memory can go undetected and under-appreciated until we 
experience such salient and frustrating failures. An interesting facet of such 
everyday memory failures, however, is what they reveal about the general 
function and architecture of the recognition memory system: Memories can be 
strong, weak, detailed, or partial, yet they are all “memory.” The aim of this 
dissertation is to critically examine several competing hypotheses regarding the 
components of episodic memory, including the nature of recollection and the 
functional role of eye movements across encoding and retrieval.  
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Recognition Memory 
In broadly conceptualizing recognition memory, in particular the 
experience of recollection, two dominant and opposing views have persisted for 
decades, continuous and threshold models. Variations of each model have been 
proposed, each with varying degrees of success, but for present purposes, they 
will be dichotomized by their theoretical treatment of recollection. Hybrid 
models, which combine select elements from continuous and threshold models, 
will also be discussed. All of the models assume that memory decisions are based 
on the retrieval of some degree of evidence (for consistency, I will call that 
evidence “strength;” this is for clarity, not a theoretical stance).  
Threshold Models 
Threshold models are often traced back to Fechner’s psychophysical 
research (Boring, 1929), because the assumption inherent in these models is that a 
single "evidence" threshold must be exceeded before an item is detected as 
previously encountered. High-threshold model is perhaps the simplest of such 
views: According to high-threshold model, memory strength is characterized by 
two distributions (often visually depicted as square distributions, but this is not a 
theoretically-constrained assumption), one representing target item strength and 
one representing foil item strength. Because targets have more inherent strength, 
the target distribution is centered to the right of the foil distribution. A critical 
assumption of this model regards the tails of the foil distribution. Specifically, 
high-threshold model assumes that the lower tail of the foil distribution does not 
extend beyond the lower tail of the target distribution; it is entirely encapsulated 
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by the target distribution. Further, high-threshold model predicts that observers 
adopt a single criterion, which divides the distribution of memory strength into 
dichotomous old/new responses (see Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). If the 
criterion is set exactly at the threshold, performance will be perfect (all hits and 
no false alarms). Observers rarely select the ideal criterion, however, and in cases 
in which old items go undetected, this model assumes that the observer should 
have no conscious feelings of memory.  
 Similarly, high-low threshold model (sometimes referred to simply as two-
high threshold model, see Hilford et al., 2002; Yonelinas, 2002) assumes that 
memory is a categorical process, but it includes a method by which new items can 
be “recognized” as new (e.g., “I would have remembered the word waffle because 
my dog’s name is Eggo”). Specifically, this model also proposes two overlapping 
distributions of memory strength for targets and foils, but, in contrast to standard 
high-threshold model, it assumes that the foil distribution extends beyond the 
lower tail of the target distribution. Observers still set a single criterion, reflecting 
all-or-none memory retrieval, but they are also assumed to “recognize” new items 
from the portion of the foil distribution that does not overlap the targets. 
Continuous Models 
In contrast to threshold models, continuous models do not make the 
assumption that recollection is a threshold, all-or-none process. Rather, they posit 
a continuous stream of evidence, capable of eliciting a range of recollected 
details. As summarized by Wixted (2007; Wixted & Mickes, 2010), continuous 
models are based on the principles of signal-detection theory, and suggest that 
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recognition memory decisions are made by comparing the strength of the 
retrieved memory signal to a decision criterion. As in standard signal-detection 
theory, this view proposes the theoretical existence of two Gaussian distributions 
(see Figure 1), one reflecting target strength and one reflecting foil strength. 
During a recognition test, any item that yields memory strength exceeding the 
decision criterion is judged “old,” whereas items with lower strengths are judged 
“new.” Although equal-variance models (left panel of Figure 1) usefully illustrate 
general signal-detection-based models (and, in fact, have been incorporated into 
hybrid models, see below), abundant evidence supports unequal variance 
distributions, wherein the target distribution is wider than the foil distribution 
(right panel of Figure 1; see, Ratcliff, Sheu, & Gronlund, 1992; Wixted & Stretch, 
2004). Critically, regardless of the distributional assumptions, continuous models 
all propose that recognition decisions are based on a concept of continuous 










Figure 1. Single-process, signal-detection models of recognition memory. The left 
set of distributions corresponds to equal-variance models and the right set 
corresponds to unequal-variance models. Adapted from Wixted (2007). 
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Hybrid Models 
Contemporary threshold theories, such as dual-process signal detection 
theory (DPSD, see Yonelinas, 1994, 2001), incorporate elements from signal-
detection theory. In similar fashion, recent continuous theories, such as 
continuous dual-process signal-detection (CDP) theory (Wixted & Mickes, 2010), 
incorporate aspects of dual-process theory, resulting in different takes on hybrid 
models.  
Hybrid threshold theories, henceforth, “dual-process theories,” are 
intuitively appealing. In the “butcher on the bus” example described above, 
people have the strong sense that they are not recollecting episodic detail; instead 
the butcher is merely familiar. This feeling of knowing can be easily contrasted 
with more richly detailed memories, such as not only recognizing your butcher, 
but also remembering that he recently gave you a great recipe for grilled salmon. 
This intuitive feeling of mnemonic dissociation encapsulates the nature of dual-
process theories. Rather than assume that the same processes support detailed and 
relatively vague memories, as does not subjectively seem true, dual-process 
theories propose that recognition memory is served by two distinct, independent 
processes, recollection and familiarity (Jacoby, 1991). Whereas recollection is 
assumed to occur by consciously controlled processing, reflecting a person’s 
ability to recall the specific details of the encoding event, familiarity is said to 
operate quickly and automatically, reflecting a vague “feeling of knowing” that 
the encoding event had occurred.  
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An early version of a hybrid DPSD model was the two-criterion model, 
wherein familiarity-based decisions are made quickly on the basis of whether they 
fall above a high criterion or below a low criterion (Atkinson & Juola, 1973, 
1974, as cited in Wixted, 2007). According to this model, recollection is only 
initiated if the memory strength falls between the two criteria, acting, in essence, 
as a backup plan. Later, Yonelinas (1994, 2001) provided another attempt to 
combine the two models, with the DPSD model. According to DPSD, recollection 
is a high-threshold, categorical process; it either occurs or does not. Familiarity, 
on the other hand, is generally viewed as a continuous, ahistorical memory 
strength variable, capable of ranging in strength from low to high (Mandler, 1980; 
Yonelinas, 1994). Familiarity, being described by strength of the signal, is 
therefore compatible with an equal-variance signal detection model. DPSD differs 
from the two-criterion model of Atkinson and Juola primarily in its order of 
operations (and its added quantitative detail). Whereas the two-criterion model 
assumes that recollection is initiated as a backup for failures of familiarity, DPSD 
assumes that familiarity-based decisions are initiated following failures of 
recollection. That is, if recollection does not occur, responses are based on 
familiarity.   
The majority of evidence in favor of separate recollection and familiarity 
processes comes from functional process dissociations, or manipulations that 
affect the contributions of each system independently. For example, several 
studies have indicated that responses based on familiarity are faster than those 
based on recollection (e.g., Hintzman & Caulton, 1997; Hintzman, Caulton, & 
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Levitin, 1998). Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that this fast familiarity 
process leads to increased false alarms immediately after the presentation of a 
new item, but that the false alarm probability drops off with increased time, 
reflecting slow recollective retrieval dynamics (e.g., Gronlund & Ratcliff, 1989; 
Hintzman & Curran, 1994; Jacoby, 1999; McElree, Dolan, & Jacoby, 1999). 
Using event related potentials (ERPs), many studies have also found distinct 
electrophysiological correlates for recognition memory responses based on 
recollection versus familiarity (Curran, 2000; Duarte, Ranganath, Winward, 
Hayward, & Knight, 2004; Guo, Duan, Li, & Paller, 2006; Klimesch, 
Dopplemayr, Yonelinas, Kroll, Lazzara, Rohm, & Gruber, 2001) and some have 
found opposite effects on recollection and familiarity following hippocampal 
damage (Sauvage, Fortin, Owens, Yonelinas, & Eichenbaum, 2008). These 
dissociations (and others) strongly suggest that two separate neural substrates 
underlie recognition memory. 
The recent CDP model (Wixted & Mickes, 2010) combines select 
elements of dual-process theory with key aspects of signal-detection theory, 
yielding a signal-detection-based model capable of explaining subjective feelings 
of recollection versus familiarity. According to this model, separate (non-
independent) recollection and familiarity components exist, but memory decisions 
are still based on a continuous stream of evidence, comprised of the additive 
strength from each component. Perceivers are privy to the predominant source of 
evidence, either recollection or familiarity, and therefore possess different states 
of awareness associated with each component (e.g., an item feels familiar if the 
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predominant source of evidence is the familiarity component). Evidence in favor 
of this model primarily comes from the Remember/Know task (see below). 
Model Comparison 
 Although there are many methods by which to compare and contrast 
single- and dual-process theories, two of the most commonly-used methods are 
analysis of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves, and the 
Remember/Know paradigm (Tulving, 1983). Evaluating the shapes of ROCs (and 
of their z-transformed counterparts, z-ROCs) has informed the dual- versus single-
process debate for years, leading to refinement of theories and the development of 
newer models (e.g., DPSD and CDP).  
Stated broadly, ROC curves are plots of the cumulative hit rate versus the 
cumulative false alarm rate at various levels of bias or confidence (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007). When examined in normalized space, 
z-ROCs represent the ratio of the standard deviation of the foil distribution to the 
standard deviation of the target distribution (σfoil/σtarget). Recall that most single-
process views of memory adopt the unequal variances assumption. Specifically, 
they predict that the standard deviation of the target distribution will be 1.25 times 
that of the foil distribution, yielding a z-ROC slope of 0.80. Whereas models with 
a high-threshold component (i.e., models predicting all-or-none memory) predict 
linear ROCs and curvilinear z-ROCs, single-process models predict curvilinear 
ROCs and linear z-ROCs (Wixted, 2007). This curvilinear prediction is directly 
related to the assumption of a continuous memory process; accurate recognition 
memory can be observed at various levels of confidence, which is graphically 
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represented by a curvilinear function. On the other hand, if recollection is an 
either/or categorical process, memory retrieval will only be successful at the 
highest level of confidence or bias, yielding a linear function in standard plots and 
a curved function in z-space. 
Overwhelming support for the ROC predictions of signal-detection 
models, relative to high-threshold models, has resulted in near abandonment of 
high-threshold models (see Yonelinas & Parks, 2007; Wixted, 2007). Although 
dual-process theories still incorporate the high-threshold assumption for 
recollection, they are able to make distinct ROC predictions because of the signal-
detection familiarity process. Manipulations thought to affect recollection and 
familiarity independently have been shown to influence the shape of the ROC, 
which is commonly interpreted as evidence for dual-process theories (Yonelinas 
& Parks, 2007). Additionally, when recollection and familiarity are put in 
opposition to one another (as in the exclusion condition of Jacoby’s (1991) 
process-dissociation procedure), ROCs are curvilinear and negative in slope, 
while z-ROCs are linear (although they take on a pronounced, inverted U-shaped 
function when recollection is more prominent; see Yonelinas, 1994; Yonelinas, 
Regehr, & Jacoby, 1995). 
Other research, however, supports a single-process signal-detection 
account of memory, with more evidence in support of UVSD models over equal-
variance signal-detection models, because equal variance models, like high-
threshold models, predict linear ROCs with a slope of 1.0. Curvilinear ROCs have 
been repeatedly observed throughout the literature (Glanzer, Kim, Hilford, & 
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Adams, 1999; Ratcliff, Sheu, & Gronlund, 1992; Wixted, 2007), and UVSD has 
been successfully extended to describe performance in several recognition 
memory paradigms (Glanzer, Hilford, & Kim, 2004; Hilford, Glanzer, Kim, & 
DeCarlo, 2002). In fact, as summarized by Wixted (2007), every memory study 
between the years of 1958 and 1997 yielded curvilinear ROCs. Further, meta-
analyses of confidence-based ROCs demonstrate that z-ROCs are typically linear, 
with slopes of less than 1.0, and that the slopes increase as performance decreases 
(Glanzer et al., 1999; Ratcliff et al., 1992). This is important for single-process 
models that adopt the assumption of unequal variances, because a common 
finding is that the slope of the z-ROC is 0.80 (Ratcliff et al., 1992), supporting the 
notion that the standard deviation of the target distribution is 1.25 times that of the 
foil distribution. 
A second common method used to adjudicate between single- and dual-
process theories is the Remember/Know (RK) paradigm, which makes use of 
subjects’ subjective feelings of the relative specificity of their memory. Although 
Tulving (1985) initially intended for the procedure to differentiate between states 
of awareness associated with subjective experiences of memory, it has more 
recently been used to support dual-process theories of recognition memory (see 
Wixted & Mickes, 2010). In this paradigm, participants are assumed to appreciate 
why they make old/new recognition decisions. If an item is judged “old,” there 
are three possible routes to this decision, an item can be “remembered,” “known” 
(henceforth R and K) or simply guessed (although not all studies use a “guess” 
option). Jacoby, Yonelinas, and Jennings (1997) suggested that remember 
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responses reflect episodic retrieval, and the function of conscious recollection, 
whereas know responses reflect familiarity, or the recognition of an item’s status 
as “old” without concomitant recollection of its earlier presentation (see also, 
Yonelinas, 2002). 
 Results from several studies (e.g., Engelkamp & Dehn, 1997; Gardiner, 
1988; Gardiner, Java, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1996; Gardiner & Java, 1991; 
Gardiner & Parkin, 1990; Rajaram, 1993) indicate that different experimental 
manipulations selectively enhance or diminish remember/know response 
frequencies, supporting Gardiner’s (1988) reports of functional dissociations 
between R and K responses. These dissociations imply that recollection and 
familiarity are distinct, independent processes, and their existence is typically 
interpreted within a dual-process framework (Gardiner, 2001, as cited by Dunn, 
2004). 
This interpretation has been criticized, however, as several researchers 
have proposed that the response types reflect confidence in memory more than 
they reflect the function of two separate memory processes (Donaldson, 1996; 
Hirshman, 1998). Instructions to respond “remember” or “know,” according to 
this view, are interpreted by participants as a requirement to adopt a more 
conservative or liberal response criterion, respectively (Dunn, 2004). Donaldson 
(1996) approached the RK task from a single-process viewpoint, and suggested 
that participants complete the task by adopting two decision criteria, one (high 
criterion) for remember responses and one (low criterion) for know responses. He 
argued that, although participants were issuing responses that appeared to reflect 
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two different memory systems, they were responding in line with their decision 
criteria, which reflected memory strength, and not two different processes (cf. 
Knowlton & Squire, 1995). Meta-analyses of decades of data and critical tests of 
recent data have been taken to support both single-process (Donaldson, 1996; 
Dunn, 2004, 2008; Hirshman & Master, 1997; Wixted, 2007; Wixted & Stretch, 
2004) and dual-process models (Conway, Dewhurst, Pearson, & Sapute, 2001; 
Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1998, 2002; Yonelinas, 2002).  
The recent hybrid CDP model (Wixted & Mickes, 2010) was developed in 
response to the dual-process interpretation of RK data. Although the model is 
entirely based upon signal-detection theory, it assumes that participants are able to 
determine whether their memorial experiences are based on the function of 
recollection or familiarity. In short, CDP assumes that recognition decisions 
reflect the combined influence of recollection and familiarity, such that decisions 
are still based on a ‘strength of evidence’ dimension, but that participants have 
access to the source of the predominant strength. Evidence for this model comes 
from RK tasks in which participants provide both confidence estimates and source 
discriminations. During encoding, participants study words presented at either the 
top or bottom of the screen, in red or blue font. When prompted to retrieve an 
item (with a centrally-presented, black-ink item), participants provide RK 
judgments, confidence estimates, and responses regarding original location and 
color (source discriminations). Wixted and Mickes found that, although “know” 
responses can be associated with a high degree of confidence, corresponding 
source accuracy was lower, relative to “remember” responses.  
  13 
As discussed above, neuropsychological evidence has consistently been 
interpreted within a dual-process framework, and this is largely because of the use 
of RK in neuroimaging studies. In many experiments, researchers have observed 
elevated activity in the hippocampus for R judgments, and almost no activity for 
K judgments (e.g., Aggleton, Vann, Denby, Dix, Mayes, Roberts, et al., 2005; 
Eldridge, Engel, Zeineh, Bookheimer, & Knowlton, 2000; Holdstock, Mayes, 
Gong, Roberts, & Kapur, 2005; Moscovitch & McAndrews, 2002; Uncapher & 
Rugg, 2005; Verfaellie, Rajaram, Fossum, & Williams, 2008; Yonelinas, Kroll, 
Quamme, Lazzara, Sauve, Widaman et al., 2002). One difficulty in interpreting 
these effects, however, is that R judgments are typically associated with higher 
confidence, relative to K judgments (e.g., Dunn, 2004, 2008; Rotello & Zeng, 
2008; Wixted & Mickes, 2010; Wixted & Stretch, 2004), making it impossible to 
determine whether the effect arises from differences in fundamental processes, or 
differences in retrieved strength. This “strength confound” was originally pointed 
out by Wixted (2009), who noted that recollective detail is almost never entirely 
absent from know judgments (see Mickes et al., 2009; Wais, et al., 2008). In fact, 
when subjective retrieval strength was equated, Wais, Squire, and Wixted (2009) 
observed similar levels of hippocampal activity during putatively recollection-
based and familiarity-based memories (see also Kirwan et al., 2008; Wais, 2008; 
Wais, Wixted, Hopkins, & Squire, 2006). In order to interpret RK data, it seems, 
one needs to take an additional step and collect overt, metacognitive estimates of 
confidence. 
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The experiments reported here assessed the characteristics of recognition 
memory using ROC analyses and the source-monitoring framework. Whereas the 
RK paradigm relies upon participants’ subjective states of awareness, source-
monitoring paradigms allow researchers to estimate the degrees of specificity in 
retrieved memories, particularly when paradigms are designed so as to allow 
multiple sources (or dimensions) of information to be recalled.  
Source Monitoring 
To this point, the discussion of memory has focused solely on item 
memory, the ability to recognize that information has been previously encountered 
(see Malmberg, 2008, for a review). But, as the RK procedure makes apparent, 
memory is typically more elaborate than merely recognizing previously-acquired 
information. Often, people are able to identify the characteristics of the learning 
event, such as who taught it, or where it was learned. This is akin to remembering 
both that you were promised a raise (item memory), and that your immediate 
supervisor was the one who promised it (source memory). The source monitoring 
framework (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), an extension of the reality-
monitoring framework (Johnson & Raye, 1981), was developed to assess 
mnemonic decision processes in the retrieval of specific details from memory. 
During standard source memory experiments, participants’ memory for the 
qualitative characteristics (e.g., perceptual, contextual, semantic, and affective 
details) of the encoding event are queried (often following an assessment of item 
memory, but see DeCarlo, 2003, for an exception). In addition to the perceptual, 
contextual, semantic, and affective details that may serve as diagnostic source 
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information, sources can also include the cognitive operations performed during 
the course of encoding. Although they share many characteristics, the source 
monitoring framework differs from reality monitoring in that the source 
monitoring framework considers the underlying decision processes of source 
recollection (Johnson et al., 1993).   
 According to Johnson et al. (1993), source monitoring decisions are based 
on the richness of the memory trace. For example, whereas memories for 
imagined events are likely to be characterized by an emphasis on cognitive 
operations, memories for performed actions are more likely to be characterized by 
detailed perceptual, temporal, and spatial information, with less emphasis on 
cognitive operations. This information is not necessarily the product of a 
consciously-controlled search process during remembering; often source 
information accompanies memories automatically. When source memory 
decisions are more deliberate (i.e., when source information does not immediately 
accompany a memory), they are often slow and characterized by logical 
assessment (Johnson et al., 1993). Regardless of the method by which they are 
retrieved, the source details must be weighed against decision criteria (or 
criterion, depending on method). If enough details are retrieved to support one 
source judgment over another, then the item is ascribed to that particular source 
(Johnson et al., 1993). Depending on methodological changes or individual 
differences, source decisions can be made more or less quickly, and with more or 
less deliberation (see Dodson & Johnson, 1993; Johnson & Raye, 1981; Marsh & 
Hicks, 1998). 
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One of the most debated questions in source monitoring regards whether 
the paradigm reveals the functioning of a separate, threshold recollection process. 
Clearly, retrieving source content involves recollecting some form of detail, 
leading several researchers to suggest that source monitoring critically involves an 
independent recollection process (Guttentag & Carroll, 1997; Perfect, Mayes, 
Downes, & Van Eijk, 1996; Quamme, Frederick, Kroll, Yonelinas, & Dobbins, 
2002; Yonelinas, 1999). Demonstrations of partial source memory (e.g., Bink, 
Marsh, & Hicks, 1999; Dodson, Holland, & Shimamura, 1998; Hicks, Marsh, & 
Ritschel, 2002), and of preserved source memory in the absence of item memory 
(e.g., Cook, Marsh, & Hicks, 2006; Starns, Hicks, Brown, & Martin, 2008), have 
recently been taken to suggest that source memories are characterized by retrieval 
from a continuous (as opposed to all-or-none) recollection process. By this logic, 
any degree of recollection can support any response to an assessment of item 
memory (although stronger evidence should still naturally yield higher item 
accuracy and better source memory). Alternatively, if recollection is conceived of 
as a threshold process, failing to accumulate enough evidence to support the more 
fundamental item memory response should not result in full or partial recollection 
of source details, even if one assumes that partial source recollection follows a 
threshold process operating on an imperfectly encoded memory trace (e.g., Parks 
& Yonelinas, 2007). 
In standard source memory experiments, participants give a source 
judgment following “old” item responses (or, in some cases, they respond 
“Source 1,” “Source 2,” “new”). Unless the participant claims to have studied the 
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item, they are not asked to make a source judgment. This practice reflects an 
assumption inherent in multinomial models of source memory, which have been 
used to describe the relationships among various components of item and source 
memory decisions (e.g., Batchelder & Riefer, 1990): Specifically, source 
discrimination is not possible for items that are not first recognized. Applying 
such models to source memory requires the assumption of discrete cognitive 
states (e.g., you either recognize an item with probability D, or you fail to 
recognize it, with probably 1 – D; see Bayen, Murnane, & Erdfelder, 1996; 
Dodson et al., 1998; Dodson & Shimamura, 2000; Meiser & Bröder, 2002). These 
models are consistent with the assumption of an all-or-none recollection process.  
Recently, models have been proposed which loosen the all-or-none 
assumption, and instead suggest that source retrieval follows a continuously-
distributed, signal-detection process (e.g., Banks, 2000; DeCarlo, 2003; Glanzer, 
Hilford, & Kim, 2004; Hilford, Glanzer, Kim, & DeCarlo, 2002; Qin, Raye, 
Johnson, & Mitchell, 2001; Slotnick & Dodson, 2005; Slotnick, Klein, Dodson, & 
Shimamura, 2000; Starns et al., 2008). Such models propose the existence of 
separate strength distributions for targets from each of the studied sources, and a 
distribution for new items. Starns and colleagues (2008) provided compelling 
evidence for the existence of a signal-detection process by demonstrating that 
their multivariate signal detection model adequately described the observation of 
accurate source memory in the absence of accurate item memory. According to 
their model, for each item presented on a recognition test, participants retrieve a 
certain amount of evidence that the item was studied and a certain amount of 
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evidence that the item belongs to one source or the other. Even if item strength 
fails to surpass the recognition criterion, the source evidence may still surpass a 
(liberal) source criterion. Cook, Marsh, and Hicks (2006) reported a similar 
finding; even when participants could not produce studied items on cued recall, 
they could nonetheless demonstrate accurate source discrimination. 
The notion that source memory is not an all-or-none process is supported 
by findings of source memory in the absence of item memory, and also by 
demonstrations of partial source recollection. Dodson et al. (1998) observed that, 
in the absence of correct source discriminations, participants can base source 
judgments on partial evidence. In their study, participants studied words spoken 
by one of four speakers, either all males or half males, each identified by face and 
name. During recognition, participants first gave old/new responses to printed 
items. Contingent upon “old” responses, participants identified the original source 
(i.e., speaker name) of the learned item. By examining response frequencies, 
Dodson et al. (1998) determined that source memories were specific or partial. 
Specific source memories were observed when participants correctly identified 
the original speaker, and partial source memories were observed when 
participants made within-gender source misattributions. Critically, these within-
gender source misattributions were made with above-chance frequency, reflecting 
partial evidence supporting source judgments. This finding provides strong 
evidence in favor of a continuous source recognition process. Consistent evidence 
has also been observed in the absence of item recognition: When people are 
unable to retrieve studied items, they are nevertheless able to provide partial 
  19 
information about the source of the material (e.g., Koriat, Levy-Sadot, Edry, & de 
Marcas, 2003; Kurilla & Westerman, 2010). 
The well-known tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) phenomenon also suggests that 
recollection is graded. In a TOT state, people cannot retrieve sought-after 
information from long-term memory, despite being positive that they possess the 
information (e.g., when you cannot name an actor in a movie, but know that you 
know his name; see Brown & McNeill, 1966; Schwartz, 2002). Although Google 
has helped to eliminate the struggle to internally resolve TOTs, they are still often 
characterized by the ability to recall partial information. For example, in the 
example just given, you may remember that the actor has a weird name with a K 
in it, and that he was in the show ‘24,’ but you may be unable to resolve that you 
are thinking of Kiefer Sutherland. Extensive evidence has revealed that TOT 
states involve recollection of partial details of the encoding event (see Maril, 
Simons, Weaver, & Schacter, 2005, for a review). These details include the first 
and last letters of the word (Koriat & Lieblich, 1974), the number of syllables 
(Rubin, 1975), and synonyms for the word (Cohen & Faulkner, 1986), among 
others. Critically, although these recollections are clearly only partial, they are 
typically accompanied by high confidence that the item will be retrieved. A 
threshold-based recollection process would have difficulty explaining these 
phenomena.    
The necessity of an independent recollection process during source 
retrieval has often been debated by combining source monitoring with the RK 
procedure. Recall that many researchers suggest that R responses reflect 
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recollection (e.g., Jacoby et al., 1997; Yonelinas, 2002; but see Wixted & Mickes, 
2010). If this is true, then researchers should observe similar effects of various 
manipulations on the rates of “remembering” and retrieving accurate source 
information. For example, encoding manipulations that enhance source 
recognition accuracy also increase the frequency of R responses (Conway & 
Dewhurst, 1995; Dewhurst & Hitch, 1999; Donaldson, MacKenzie, & Underhill, 
1996). In a further demonstration of the similarity of the two processes, Rugg et 
al. (1998) observed that the pattern of electrophysiological brain activity observed 
during R responses is the same as the pattern observed during successful source 
retrieval. Abundant evidence also suggests that source retrieval is more successful 
following R, relative to K, responses (Dewhurst & Hitch, 1999; Meiser & Bröder, 
2002; Perfect, Mayes, Downes, & Van Eijk, 1996; Wixted & Mickes, 2010). On 
the other hand, however, inconsistent data have been observed by researchers who 
have found that source memory is just as, if not more, accurate following K 
responses, relative to R responses (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995; Hicks, Marsh, & 
Ritschel, 2002). In fact, when Rotello, Macmillan, Reeder, and Wong (2005) 
instructed participants that they might need to justify their R responses (e.g., with 
recollected details), the frequency of R responses decreased. R response 
frequencies were also influenced by bias manipulations, suggesting that they are 
not process-pure reflections of an all-or-none recollection process. 
The debate over the processes that support episodic memory, recollection 
and familiarity, can be addressed through the source monitoring paradigm. 
Although the results have been equivocal, with respect to supporting one theory 
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over another, single- and dual-process theories make clear predictions about the 
role of recollection in source retrieval. Whereas dual-process theorists have 
argued that threshold processes can account for partial source recollection (by 
assuming that only some proportion of information about the encoded event 
surpasses threshold; Parks & Yonelinas, 2007), this explanation is unsatisfying, 
because responses based on all-or-none recollection should be accompanied by 
high confidence in the decision, which is not consistently observed (Wixted, 
2007). As with item memory, source memory is amenable to analysis via ROC 
curves, because single- and dual-process theories make competing predictions 
regarding their linearity or curvilinearity. Linear ROCs (with curved z-ROCs), 
which imply a threshold recollection process consistent with dual-process 
theories, have been observed repeatedly (Parks & Yonelinas, 2007; Yonelinas, 
1999; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007). Yet curved ROCs (with linear z-ROCs), 
consistent with single-process, signal-detection views, have been observed across 
many other studies (e.g., Dodson, Bawa, & Slotnick, 2007; Glanzer, Hilford, & 
Kim, 2004; Hilford, Glanzer, Kim, & DeCarlo, 2002; Qin, Raye, Johnson, & 
Mitchell, 2001; Slotnick & Dodson, 2005; Slotnick, Klein, Dodson, & 
Shimamura, 2000). Attempts have been made to reconcile these disparate findings 
by appealing to a “unitized familiarity” process, wherein item and source 
information are contextually bound during encoding, yielding source judgments 
based on familiarity (see Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2008). Most evidence, 
however, has suggested that a continuous recollection process is the more 
plausible account for the findings. For example, Mickes, Johnson, and Wixted 
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(2010) observed that increases in presentation frequency (a manipulation assumed 
to influence recollection) were associated with increases in ROC curvilinearity, 
the frequency of R responses, and cued recall accuracy. This relationship suggests 
that recollection plays a critical role, not unitized familiarity. 
To address the single-/dual-process debate, the current experiments 
adopted a modified source monitoring paradigm from Dodson et al. (1998), aimed 
at investigating the existence of partial source recollection. Recall that dual-
process theories do not predict partial source retrieval, as recollection is a 
threshold process. By monitoring eye movements, a commonly used index of 
attention, as participants encoded material, I was able to guard against any overt 
differences in attention across trials. While recording eye movements, pupil size 
measures were also continuously recorded, which allow estimates of memory 
strength without soliciting overt metacognitive estimates of memory strength or 
confidence (see below). 
Eye Movements in Memory 
Although saccadic eye movements are central to visual processing (Ross 
& Ma-Wyatt, 2003), they account for only a small portion of eye movements that 
people generate. Further, saccadic eye movements are unique among other types 
of eye movements (e.g., smooth pursuit, vergence, vestibular) in that they are the 
only type to direct gaze toward new sources of visual information (Richardson, 
Dale, & Spivey, 2007). In his classic work on eye movements, Yarbus (1967, as 
cited in Tatler, Wade, Kwan, Findlay, & Velichkovsky, 2010) demonstrated that 
different task instructions (e.g., free-viewing versus making an inference about 
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the scene) yielded different patterns of viewing behavior as people inspected 
visual scenes; eye movements were guided by strategic cognitive processes, and 
not solely by bottom-up perceptual influences. Since that time, researchers have 
shown that saccadic eye movements are influenced by top-down processes, or the 
expectations of the perceiver (Godijn & Theeuwes, 2002), and ongoing cognitive 
activity (e.g., Ferreira, Apel, & Henderson, 2008).  Saccadic eye movements have 
been used to document the time course of cognitive processing across domains, 
including speech perception (e.g., Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & 
Sedivy, 1995), face perception (e.g., Goldinger, He, & Papesh, 2009; Henderson, 
Williams, & Falk, 2005; Mäntylä & Holm, 2006), reading (Rayner, 1998; 
Reichle, Warren, & McConnell, 2009), and scene processing (e.g., Althoff & 
Cohen, 1999; Henderson, Weeks, & Hollingworth, 1999; Parker, 1978). In many 
cases, however, these eye movements occur in the absence of visual information. 
Such non-visually guided saccades are often directed to spatial locations that once 
contained relevant information, but are now empty (e.g., Edelman & Goldberg, 
2001). These non-visual gaze patterns (NVGPs), which include saccades and 
fixations (Micic, Ehrlichman, & Chen, 2010), are not initiated for the benefit of 
social communication: NVGPs occur during phone conversations (Beattie & 
Barnard, 1979), in darkness (Ehrlichman & Barrett, 1983), and when the eyes are 
closed (Ehrlichman, Micic, Sousa, & Zhu, 2007).   
 Although the neural locus of NVGPs remains obscure (although see Micic 
et al., 2010), they appear closely tied to memory retrieval. Early evidence for this 
comes from Bergstrom and Hiscock (1988), who observed higher eye movement 
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rates during tasks that involved greater memory search (e.g., unconstrained tasks, 
“name a five-letter word with three consonants and two vowels”), relative to tasks 
involving less memory search (e.g., vowel counting). Subsequent work by 
Ehrlichman and colleagues (Ehrlichman et al., 2007; Micic et al., 2010) 
confirmed this observation: Participants engage in far more NVGPs during tasks 
requiring extensive memory search and access to long-term memory (e.g., 
recalling lists of words, naming synonyms), relative to less long-term memory 
demanding tasks (e.g., reciting the alphabet, n-back). These eye movements are 
not sensitive to variations in levels of processing, but occur during all forms of 
long-term retrieval (Micic et al., 2010). Further, word recall performance is 
unaffected by suppression of NVGPs, suggesting that these eye movements are 
not functional for retrieval (but see Lyle, Logan, & Roediger, 2008
1
).  
Other work on patterns of motor behaviors and their relation to memory 
suggests that motoric and spatial processing are closely related, and that repetition 
of a motor program (behaved or observed) facilitates recognition memory 
(Engelkamp, Zimmer, Mohr, & Sellen 1994; Fendrich, Healy, & Bourne, 1991; 
Fendrich, 1998; Zimmer, 1998). Research on the rate of NVGPs (e.g., Ehrlichman 
et al., 2007; Micic et al., 2010) has not closely examined the direction, or target, 
of saccadic eye movements; instead, such research is concerned with the 
                                                 
1 Lyle and colleagues (Lyle et al., 2008a, b; Lyle & Jacobs, 2010) have documented ‘saccade-
induced retrieval enhancement,’ whereby fast bilateral saccades are said to enhance memory 
retrieval by increasing inter-hemispheric processing in the intraparietal sulcus. This brain region 
has not been implicated in the phenomena under investigation in the current research, and is 
inconsistent with research on eye movement desensitization techniques in people with post-
traumatic stress disorder (e.g., van den Berg & van der Gaag, 2012). Further, data from our 
laboratory has failed to document the effect in hundreds of participants, casting doubt on the 
generality of the effect. 
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frequency of saccades in the absence of visual information. Although research on 
NVGPs clearly establishes a link between saccadic eye movements and memory 
processes, one of the key questions addressed in the present research is whether 
NVGPs can reflect the reinstatement of oculomotor behaviors, and whether that 
reinstatement has a functional role for memory retrieval. To date, research on this 
topic has been equivocal.  
Abundant research has demonstrated that patterns of eye movements tend 
to be reinstated across learning and retrieval (see Ballard, Hayhoe, & Pelz, 1995; 
Holm & Mäntylä, 2007; Richardson & Spivey, 2000; Ryan, Hannula, & Cohen, 
2007; Spivey & Geng, 2000; Yarbus, 1967, as cited in Tatler et al., 2010), but 
only a few studies suggest a functional role for these reinstated eye movements 
(see  Ferreira et al., 2008 for a review). Those that do suggest variants of Noton 
and Stark’s (1971) “scanpath hypothesis,” noting that if the position of the eyes is 
assumed to represent a self-generated context during encoding, then reinstating 
this context during test may facilitate memory. This is essentially the oculomotor 
equivalent to myriad demonstrations of context-dependent memory (e.g., Godden 
& Baddeley, 1975; Winograd & Church, 1988), wherein reinstated contexts, 
either external or self-generated, facilitate memory. Although some researchers 
have documented evidence against this hypothesis, such that sampling behaviors 
(i.e., fixations, fixation durations, etc.) decrease as a function of familiarity or 
memory (Althoff & Cohen, 1999, but see Melcher & Kowler, 1999), others find 
evidence that increased frequency of saccades reflects memory. For example, 
saccades are automatically directed to the location of changes in a visual scene, 
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even in the absence of conscious awareness of the change (Parker, 1978; Ryan & 
Cohen, 2004a, 2004b; Smith & Squire, 2008). The question remains, however, 
whether reprocessing or reinstated eye movements ever facilitate memory 
retrieval. 
Whether or not eye movements facilitate memory, it is clear that they at 
least reflect memory. Several researchers have found evidence that fixation 
patterns on a blank screen during retrieval mimic those during encoding (e.g., 
Ballard, Hayhoe, & Pelz, 1995; Gnadt, Bracewell, & Andersen, 1991; Johansson, 
Holsanova, & Holmqvist, 2006; Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002). Spivey and Geng 
(2000), for example, presented participants with four colored shapes in the four 
corners of a 3 x 3 display, followed by a blank screen. Moments later, a display 
was presented in which one of the items was missing and participants were asked 
a question about the missing item. In 30% - 50% of such trials, participants made 
a saccade to the location in which the missing item had been presented. This 
finding, that memory retrieval automatically accessed the spatial location from 
encoding, and yielded a saccade to that location, was also observed when 
participants in another study learned semantic information presented in one of 
four screen quadrants (the “Hollywood Squares” paradigm, see Richardson & 
Spivey, 2000). During this experiment, participants learned factual information 
auditorily, while a visual stimulus (a face or a spinning cross) was displayed in 
one of the four quadrants. When subsequently tested on the studied information in 
front of a blank display, participants’ spontaneously directed their gaze to the 
quadrant “where the information was learned” significantly more often than they 
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directed it to other quadrants. Despite this finding, and others like it (see Hoover 
& Richardson, 2008), in no case did the researchers find that saccades to formerly 
relevant locations facilitated memory retrieval. In fact, Laeng et al. (2007) 
observed a similar effect in amnesic patients; patients spontaneously refixated 
previously viewed locations during a memory test, in the absence of overt 
memory for the encoding event. The lack of this effect has led researchers to 
conclude that eye movements, and the reinstatement of their patterns, are 
obligatory effects in recognition memory, but that they are not necessarily 
functional (Ryan et al., 2007). 
Further evidence for eye movement-based memory effects comes from 
studies of relational memory and scene processing. For example, Hannula and 
colleagues (Hannula, Ryan, Tranel, & Cohen, 2007; Hannula & Ranganath, 2009) 
had participants learn face-scene pairs by superimposing individual faces upon 
specific scene images. Later, when shown a preview of a previously-learned scene 
prior to the onset of a 3-face lineup containing the learned associate face, eye 
movements were preferentially drawn to the originally-paired face within 500 ms 
of its onset. This effect occurred even in the absence of accurate behavioral 
selection of the originally-paired face (Hannula & Ranganath, 2009; Hollingworth 
et al., 2001). More recently, Hannula, Baym, Warren, and Cohen (2012) 
demonstrated that this effect is robust to manipulations of similarity, which are 
known to negatively affect behavioral performance. Participants in their study 
encoded target faces, and were later asked to pick studied faces out of 3-face 
lineups consisting of foil faces. Foils were either highly similar or less similar to 
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the target face. When the distorted faces were highly similar to the targets, 
behavioral performance suffered. Eye movements, however, were impervious to 
the similarity manipulation. Regardless of the behavioral response, fixations were 
preferentially directed to studied faces within 1000-ms of the onset of the lineup. 
Again, however, there was no evidence for a facilitative effect of eye movements 
on memory. 
Eye movements may reveal more about memory than just whether or not 
someone has previously experienced something. In a study on the reprocessing 
effect, refixations across study and test were associated with increased probability 
of retrieval (Holm & Mäntylä, 2007; Mäntylä & Holm, 2006). Mäntylä and Holm 
(2006) conducted a series of face perception and recognition experiments wherein 
participants’ eye movements were controlled via gaze-contingent displays during 
study and/or test. Using the RK procedure, Mäntylä and Holm (2006) observed 
that the frequency of R responses was significantly diminished when eye 
movements were constrained during either study or test, but that K responses 
were unaffected. Additionally, relative to K responses, R responses were 
associated with more refixations across encoding and retrieval, suggesting that 
recollection, or at least strong memory strength, is related to the degree to which 
saccades are reinstated across learning and retrieval. A similar pattern was 
observed with refixations during complex scene processing (Holm & Mäntylä, 
2007).  
Additional evidence in favor of a functional role for eye movements in 
memory retrieval comes from a study of mental imagery and memory (Laeng & 
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Teodorescu, 2002). Participants in this study examined modified checkerboard-
type patterns and were later asked to imagine them while looking at a blank 
screen. Across encoding and imagining, participants’ eye movements were highly 
correlated. Even when required to fixate centrally during encoding, participants 
spontaneously fixated centrally during mental imagery. Further, participants’ 
memory for the patterns was related to their ability to reinstate their eye 
movements. Participants who were allowed to freely move their eyes during 
encoding, but were required to fixate centrally during retrieval, showed a 
decreased ability to recall the studied pattern, relative to participants who were 
allowed to move their eyes during retrieval. In short, the debate surrounding the 
functional role of eye movements in memory retrieval is currently unresolved, and 
the evidence for such a role has been equivocal. 
Better understanding the (putatively) functional role of eye movements in 
memory retrieval will help address a theoretical debate relevant to students of 
memory. Whereas some researchers (e.g., Hoover & Richardson, 2008; 
Richardson & Spivey, 2000) interpret reprocessing effects in terms of O’Regan’s 
(1992) concept of the world as an “external memory store,” others (e,g., Ferreira 
et al., 2008; Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002) view reprocessing effects as evidence of 
rich, multi-modal memory traces, capable of enhancing memory retrieval. 
According to the ‘external memory store’ view, the constancy of the visual world 
is a perceptual illusion; eye movements are made to new locations in order to 
“access” this store, and to avoid relying upon internal memory. As quoted by 
O’Regan (1992, p. 463), “There is no need for an internal representation that is a 
  30 
faithful metric-preserving replica of the outside world in the head.” The ideas are 
very much in line with ecological scientists (e.g., Gibson, 1950, 1966; Turvey, 
1977), and with recent suggestions within the field of embodied cognition that 
cognition and action are intimately related (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 1997; 
Wilson, 2002). By this view, saccades are directed to once-occupied locations 
because there is no internal representation of what was once there; the visual 
system directs an eye movement to accumulate information, as it normally does 
during standard perception. 
On the other hand, researchers have argued that eye-movement-based 
memory effects reflect integrated memory representations consisting of the 
spatial, verbal, auditory, and action-based information present during encoding 
(Ferreira et al., 2008). According to this view, reactivating any part of that multi-
modal episodic trace enhances the probability that other parts of that trace will 
also become active. This is similar to Hintzman’s (1986, 1988) MINERVA 2, 
such that a memory probe will activate similar traces in episodic memory, 
eventually resulting in the retrieval of the most similar trace. Relevant to eye 
movements, suppose that a person is cued to recall an item that was encoded 
while her eyes were moving around the environment. The retrieval cue partially 
activates the episodic representation of that item, which consists, among other 
things, of the oculomotor behaviors present during encoding. Because retrieving 
one aspect of the episode increases the probability of retrieving other aspects, 
people are more likely to engage in refixations, even in the absence of visual 
information. This proposal is related to the ideas of ‘event files’ (Hommel, 2004) 
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and ‘object files’ (Kahneman et al., 1992), which are essentially episodic traces 
indexed by spatio-temporal information. Substantial evidence suggests that 
memory retrieval is facilitated when spatio-temporal context is continuous, or 
maintained (e.g., Gordon & Irwin, 1996; Henderson, 1994; Hommel, 2004).    
The present research examined the functional utility of saccadic eye 
movements during memory retrieval.  As noted by Richardson, Altmann, Spivey, 
and Hoover (2009), in order to determine the functional role of eye movements in 
memory retrieval, eye movements need to be manipulated at the time of retrieval, 
and they should have an appreciable effect on behavior. If eye movements are 
epiphenomenal, and reflect the function of an external memory store, there should 
be no relationship between refixations during retrieval, and the behavioral 
manifestation of retrieval. On the other hand, if eye movements are functional for 
retrieval, they should be associated with some behavioral benefit, either in 
accuracy, detail, or response time. To fully support the latter position, eye 
movements that are externally directed to previously-viewed locations should 
enhance recognition memory (assuming, however, that externally-cued fixations 
are not disruptive to behavior, as they are in working memory tasks, see Godijn & 
Threeuwes, 2012). In short, the current experiments examined whether, and to 
what extent, reinstated eye movement patterns are associated with changes in 
memory processing.  
Pupil Dilation as a Measure of Cognitive Effort 
Pupillometry, the measurement of the diameters of the eyes’ pupils, has 
been used for centuries to examine visual and cognitive processing (e.g., Fontana, 
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1765). Although it is well-known that the pupils dilate in response to changes in 
ambient lighting, it is less well-known that the pupils also dilate in response to 
non-visual stimuli, such as emotions and thoughts (Goldwater, 1972; Loewenfeld, 
1993). This distinction characterizes two independent types of pupillary reflex, 
tonic changes, which occur in response to general factors, such as emotional 
arousal, stress, and anxiety, and phasic changes, which occur following the onset 
of stimuli for cognitive processing (Karatekin, Couperus, & Marcus, 2004). These 
cognitively-evoked pupillary reflexes occur following inhibition of the 
parasympathetic nervous system’s Edinger-Westphall nucleus (Steinhauer, Siegle, 
Condray, & Pless, 2004), which is controlled by the locus coeruleus-
norepinephrine (LC-NE) system. The LC is a subcortical brain system that 
contains the noradrenergic system, which is the sole source of the 
neurotransmitter NE. This system has been shown to play a critical role in the 
control of attention (Gilzenrat, Nieuwenhuis, Jepma, & Cohen, 2010; for a 
review, see Laeng, Sirois, & Gredebäck, 2012). A role for the LC-NE system in 
memory consolidation has been determined by documenting LC-NE activity 
during memory retrieval (Sterpenich et al., 2006) and slow-wave sleep (Eschenko 
& Sara, 2008).  Relevant to the current experiments, the LC-NE system is also 
critically involved in the pupillary reflex (Koss, 1986). In combined single-cell 
recording and pupillometry studies with monkeys, researchers have documented a 
tight correspondence between pupillary reflexes and activity in cells within the 
LC-NE system (Rajkowski, Kubiak, & Ashton-Jones, 1993; Rajkowski, 
Majczynski, Clayton, & Ashton-Jones, 2004). 
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Further neurophysiological evidence for the influence of cognitive 
processing on pupil size comes from examining the muscles that control pupillary 
reflexes. Two muscles are known to control pupil dilation and constriction, the 
dilator and the sphincter; these muscles are differentially affected by activation in 
the sympathetic and parasympathetic systems (Steinhauer, Siegle, Condray, & 
Pless, 2004). As discussed above, inhibition of the parasympathetic nervous 
system has been attributed to dilation resulting from cognitive processing. This 
system also controls the activity of the sphincter muscle; when the 
parasympathetic system is inhibited, activity on the sphincter muscle decreases 
(Steinhauer et al., 2004).  These autonomic pathways hold reciprocal connections 
with the central nervous system (CNS), so it has been suggested that they can 
modulate, or be modulated by, CNS structures related to cognition (Gianaros, Van 
der Veen, & Jennings, 2004; Steinhauer, Siegle, Condray, & Pless, 2004). 
Investigations into the neural mechanisms of successful learning and memory in 
animals have revealed a close correspondence between accurate performance and 
the involvement of the autonomic system (Croiset, Nijsen, & Kamphuis, 2000). 
Such findings are paralleled by recent findings from human experiments, wherein 
increased autonomic responses (e.g., skin conductance) are positively correlated 
with memory strength for emotional words (Buchanan, Etzel, Adolphs, & Tranel, 
2006). Additionally, stimulation of the vagus nerve (a parasympathetic pathway 
known to carry signals to the brain) is associated with memory formation and 
consolidation (Clark, Naritoku, Smith, Browning, & Jensen, 1999).  
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As noted above, phasic changes in pupil diameter occur following the 
onset of cognitive processing. These reflexes are observed independently of tonic 
changes; in dark-adapted conditions, which inhibit the parasympathetic system, 
the pupils reliably dilate in response to cognitive demand (Steinhauer & Hakerem, 
1992), leading them to be referred to as task-evoked pupillary responses (TEPRs).  
Although Hess is often credited for initiating the psychological study of pupillary 
reflexes (cf., Hess, 1965; Hess & Polt, 1964; Hess, Seltzer, & Shlien, 1965), his 
research focused almost exclusively on the pupillary reflex as it reflected 
“emotionality” (Hess, 1965, p. 46), a tonic response. Since then, the “emotional” 
component of the pupillary reflex and the “cognitive” component have been 
clearly dissociated (Stanners, Coulter, Sweet, & Murphy, 1979). Kaheneman and 
Beatty (1966) are best known for initiating interest in TEPRs, and have even 
suggested that TEPRs reflect a “summed index” of brain activity during cognitive 
processing. Their early work demonstrated that pupil dilations are time-locked to 
cognitive processing, and that differences between and within tasks are 
observable via pupillometry (Kahneman, 1973; Kahneman, Beatty, & Pollack, 
1967). For example, in a digit recall task, as participants were given more 
numbers to retain, their pupils became larger; as the digits were recalled, the 
pupils constricted with each additional item (Kahneman & Beatty, 1966). 
Although pupillometry fell out of favor for some time, it has been used to infer 
cognitive effort in a variety of domains, such as lexical decision (Kuchinke, Võ, 
Hofmann, & Jacobs, 2007), attention (Kahneman, 1973; Karatekin, Couperus, & 
Marcus, 2004), word processing (Papesh & Goldinger, 2012), working memory 
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(Granholm, Asarnow, Sarkin, & Dykes, 1996; Van Gerven, Paas, Van 
Merriënboer, & Schmidt, 2004), face perception (Goldinger, He, & Papesh, 
2009), general cognitive processing (Granholm & Verney, 2004), and memory 
(Kafkas & Montaldi, 2011; Papesh, Goldinger, & Hout, 2012).  
 In the study of memory, pupillometry can be likened to ERP waveforms 
(Beatty, 1982); enlarged pupils are typically associated with increased cognitive 
demand (Porter, Troscianko, & Gilchrist, 2007). Comparing neurophysiological 
measures across study and test has been used to differentiate the neural activity 
associated with subsequently remembered versus forgotten information in both 
fMRI (e.g., Ranganath et al., 2004) and ERP investigations (e.g., Cansino & 
Trejo-Marales, 2008; Duarte, Ranganath, Winward, Hayward, & Knight, 2004; 
Guo, Duan, Li, & Paller, 2006). The logic underlying such studies is that 
encoding should utilize the same set of processes and neural substrates that are 
subsequently recruited during successful retrieval. Moreover, the strength and 
type (e.g., recollection or familiarity) of memory should be observable from 
different patterns of activation during both encoding and retrieval. In the current 
investigation, pupillometry was used to examine retrieval effort, acting in place of 
metacognitive confidence estimates.    
 Although early TEPR investigations have been criticized on the grounds 
that now-standard experimental controls were not implemented (Võ et al., 2008), 
recent work incorporates strict experimental control to eliminate the unwanted 
influence of tonic reflexes. Because pupils dilate reflexively to changes in 
luminance, color, or the spatial frequency composition of the visual input, care 
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must be taken to equate, as much as possible, stimulus characteristics in 
experimental designs that utilize pupillometry (Porter et al., 2007). Porter and 
Troscianko (2003) identified several methodological approaches that minimize 
unwanted pupillary reflexes, including the use of relatively low stimulus contrast, 
avoiding colored stimuli, and using relatively long stimulus exposure durations. 
Goldinger and Papesh (2012) recently added to this list of constraints by 
suggesting the use of relatively long (e.g., 1000-ms or more) inter-trial intervals 
(ITIs) and baseline-correction procedures. Both suggestions guard against 
carryover effects, as when the difficulty of trial n influences the waveform of trial 
n + 1. Recent work has taken such precautions into careful consideration, 
including several relevant studies on the pupillary reflex and memory. 
 One of the first demonstrations of a long-term memory effect in pupil 
dilation was observed by Võ and colleagues (2008), who were motivated by the 
similarity between pupillary waveforms and ERP waveforms, which are known to 
reflect memorial processes (Dietrich et al., 2000; Johanson et al., 2004). In their 
study, participants studied a series of positively and negatively valenced words, 
followed by a speeded old/new recognition test. Although they found effects of 
emotionality (e.g., better memory for emotional words, smaller pupils to negative, 
relative to positive, words), the most relevant finding was a “pupillary old/new 
effect,” wherein pupils were larger during trials leading to hits, relative to correct 
rejections. The authors interpreted this effect within a dual-process framework (as 
in Yonelinas, 2001, 2002), suggesting that the increased pupil size observed for 
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hits was directly related to the occurrence of recollection, because it is suggested 
to be a more cognitively demanding, slow process.  
 A similar conclusion was drawn by Kafkas and Montaldi (2011), who 
investigated the nature of incidental memory for images using a modified RK 
procedure. In their study, participants viewed images without instruction to 
remember them, and were later given a surprise memory test in which they 
distinguished memories based on degrees of familiarity (e,g., F1 – F3) or a single 
recollection response. Although they did not observe an effect differentiating 
recollection from familiarity, pupil size during encoding differed based on 
subsequent memory strength: As subsequent memory increased, pupil diameter 
decreased. These findings are suggestive, but should be interpreted with caution. 
Kafkas and Montaldi's (2011) procedure eliminated TEPRs during the encoding 
phase, leaving only tonic changes free to vary. In an investigation of phasic 
pupillary changes and memory strength, Papesh, Goldinger, and Hout (2012) 
observed the opposite pattern. After studying a series of spoken words, 
participants issued old/new memory decisions and overt confidence estimates. 
Examining pupil size by subsequent memory performance revealed a clear 
relationship between confidence and pupil size: As subsequent confidence 
increased, so too did pupil size.  
 The studies of Kafkas and Montaldi (2011) and Papesh et al. (2012) are 
difficult to compare, both due to differences in encoding instructions and stimuli. 
Evidence consistent with Papesh et al. (2012), however, has been documented in 
other pupillometry investigations using the RK procedure. Otero, Weekes, and 
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Hutton (2011) observed no difference in pupil size based on remembering or 
knowing using visual and acoustic materials. Further, this difference was not due 
to changes in conscious control: Heaver and Hutton (2011) observed pupillary 
old/new effects regardless of whether participants feigned amnesia or were told to 
report all items as “new.”  Similar effects were reported by Papesh and Goldinger 
(2011), who found a pupillary old/new effect across study and test presentations 
of auditory high and low frequency words. Specifically, when participants studied 
words that were subsequently remembered, the second presentation of the item 
was associated with enlarged pupils, as compared to subsequently forgotten and 
new items. This pattern was especially strong for low frequency words, 
suggesting that the act of remembering, coupled with the cognitive operations 
usurped in processing low frequency words (see Papesh & Goldinger, 2012), 
resulted in an overall increase in the cognitive demand of the task.  
 In the present investigation, pupillometry was used to infer underlying 
memory strength, in lieu of overt confidence estimates. In earlier, as-yet-
unpublished research (Papesh, in prep), I observed a relationship between pupil 
size and confidence that supported the use of pupillary ROCs. In that experiment, 
participants (n = 17) studied and were tested on words spoken in an unaccented 
female voice. During test, old/new recognition responses were accompanied by 
overt confidence estimates. Because of differences in response frequencies (e.g., 
participants very rarely respond that they are ‘very sure’), the pupil data were 
examined by three confidence estimates, estimates of 2, 5, and 10 (low, medium, 
and high, respectively). Figure 2 shows the relationship between pupil size and 
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confidence during test, separately for high- and low-frequency words. This 
relationship was observed for old and new items at test, and also for items during 












Figure 2. Pupil diameter as a function of confidence and word frequency during 
recognition test. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. From Papesh (in 
prep). 
 
To document the feasibility of pupillary ROCs, I constructed two sets of 
ROC/z-ROC pairs, one based on overt confidence estimates and one based on 
pupillary confidence estimates. To do so, the mean and range of pupil diameters 
were calculated. This distribution was then segmented into 10 “confidence” bins. 
Values of 1 and 10 were the extreme upper and lower tails of the distribution, 
respectively; intermediate values each represented 1/2 of the standard deviation. 
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Figure 3 displays the behavioral (top row) and pupillary (bottom row) ROCs (left 






















Figure 3. Behavioral (upper graphs) and pupillary (lower graphs) ROCs (left 
panels) and z-ROCs (right panel) fit with quadratic equations. From Papesh (in 
prep). 
 
As can be seen by visually comparing the behavioral and pupillary graphs, 
the pupillary graphs provided a more reasonable description of the data. A 
common finding in recognition memory is that low-frequency (LF) words are 
remembered better than high-frequency (HF) words (Glanzer & Adams, 1990). 
Although the behavioral ROC does not truly capture this, the pupillary ROC 
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depicts lines that are clearly separated for the two word types, suggesting that 
pupil size provides a sensitive, and accurate, estimate of memory strength.  
The Current Experiments 
The current experiments build upon previous work, addressing several 
theoretical issues of episodic memory. Specifically, the present experiments 
examined audiovisual source memory via behavioral and physiological indices. 
The research presented here was designed to address four research aims. Research 
Aim 1 was to examine the influence of source similarity on item and source 
memory judgments. Specifically, the voices used to present the material had a 
measured similarity relationship, both to one another and to the (different) voices 
used to present the test material. If memories are richly-detailed, and if these 
details are brought to mind automatically during memory retrieval, participants’ 
item and source memories should be more accurate during “low,” relative to 
“high,” similarity conditions. Research Aim 2 was to assess the degree of 
specificity in source memory. As in Dodson et al. (1998), participants in the 
current experiments could have specific or partial source memories. Unlike 
Dodson et al., specific and partial source memory were also examined during 
failures of item memory. As discussed above, dual-process theories have trouble 
predicting both partial source memory and the existence of source memory in the 
absence of the more fundamental item memory. Single-process views, particularly 
multivariate signal-detection models (e.g., Starns et al., 2008), are capable of 
predicting and explaining such findings. To further examine the nature of 
recognition memory, each of the following experiments was accompanied by 
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ROC analyses, using pupil diameter as an index of “confidence” (Research Aim 
3). Whereas dual-process theories predict linear ROCs and curvilinear z-ROCs, 
single-process views predict curvilinear ROCs and linear z-ROCs. Lastly, by 
manipulating eye movements across learning and retrieval, I will provide 
evidence that eye movements are spontaneously reinstated across study and test, 
but that externally cueing those eye movements does not necessarily improve 
memories (Research Aim 4), which has implications for two theories of eye 
movement behavior during memory retrieval. 
General Method 
Overview 
 The experiments reported here shared several methodological 
characteristics, and only differed in the testing procedures. Each experiment 
involved identical encoding procedures, and four between-subjects conditions. 
The conditions differed in the similarity of the voices used to present the study 
items (see Materials), and were broadly defined as “high similarity” (HS) and 
“low similarity” (LS), as in Dodson, Holland, and Shimamura (1998). Within 
each HS and LS group are the two conditions, HS1, HS2, LS1, and LS2. These 
are described below.  
Materials 
Ten speakers (five male) with no discernible accents or speech errors (e.g., 
lisps or pronunciation errors) recorded a list of 48 questions and 1100 high and 
low frequency words, from which, 80 words were selected for the familiarization 
task (see below) and 136 were selected for the main experiment (although word 
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frequency was not intentionally manipulated, see Table 1 for a summary of lexical 
characteristics, from Balota, Yap, Cortese, Hutchinson, Kessler et al., 2007; 
stimuli are reported in Appendix A). Eighteen volunteers (none of whom 
participated in any of the experiments reported here) multidimensionally scaled 
the voices using direct similarity ratings to all pairs of voices, yielding the 
“psychological space” shown in Figure 4.  
Table 1 
 
Summary Statistics for the Stimulus Items 
    
          Means 
   
 Word Type  n KF
† 
    Subtitle           Letters           Syllables 
High Frequency         68         250.8        355.8     4.26    1.16 
Low Frequency          68   19.1        13.2     4.26               1.15 
 
† 
















Figure 4. Multidimensional scaling solution of stimulus voices (note: names are 
fictional, and do not reflect the actual name of the speaker). 
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From this distribution, voices were grouped into 4 similarity conditions 
(HS1, HS2, LS1, LS2). High-similarity conditions were comprised of all same-
sex speakers; HS1 used all male speakers and HS2 used all female speakers. Low-
similarity conditions were composed of 2 males and 2 females, selected such that 
the same-gender speakers were not “close” in psychological space. The voices in 
LS1 were Emma, Anne, Steve, and Erik and those in LS2 were Whitney, Chloe, 
Donald, and Arthur.  The male and female test voices were selected to represent 
the “average” male and female voices, so as to not be too confusable with any 
particular study speaker. The faces used to represent the speakers were selected 
from Ekman and Matsumoto (1993). All of the people in the database were 
White, and photographed under constant lighting conditions with the same visible 
clothing. 
Study Procedures 
 Participants were tested individually in a dimly-lit, sound-attenuated 
booth. A chin rest maintained head position and viewing distance at 60 cm. Eye 
movements and pupil dilation were continuously recorded from both eyes at 50 
Hz by a Tobii 1750 eye tracker and behavioral responses were recorded by an 
SRBox. E-Prime software managed both the presentation of the experiment and 
data collection (Psychology Software Tools, 2006). The luminance of the screen 
was controlled by the background color (RGB 150, 150, 150, as in Kuchinke et 
al., 2007), which was used on every screen. 
 Participants were first familiarized with the experiment and the eye 
tracker. After the chin rest was adjusted, such that eye position was maintained 
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centrally on the horizontal axis and a slightly above-centrally on the vertical axis, 
participants were calibrated on the eye tracker. The calibration routine randomly 
presents nine fixation points (indicated by the movement of a blue dot) over the 
range of the display and participants “follow the dot” as it moves to each location. 
If the software or the researcher identified any missed fixations, the calibration 
routine was repeated. All participants were successfully calibrated within two 
attempts. 
 To familiarize participants with the voices and faces used in this 
experiment, I used a modified version of the familiarization task used by Dodson, 
Holland, and Shimamura (1998). For each face-name pair, participants were 
shown a full-screen image of a face and its name while listening to a question 
spoken by that speaker; all four face-name pairs were shown sequentially, 
speaking the same question
2
.  After the fourth face, participants selected the 
answer to the question from on-screen multiple-choice options. After each block 
of 12 questions (four blocks total), participants completed a familiarization test, in 
which they were presented with 20 single words, five spoken by each of the four 
speakers.  After hearing each word, participants were shown the four face-name 
pairs at the bottom of the screen, in random order on every trial. They selected the 
face-name pair that they believed matched the voice. All participants completed 
the voice-learning phase with at least 70% accuracy (chance was 25% in HS and 
50% in LS).  
                                                 
2 This departs from the method used by Dodson et al. (1998), and was meant to encourage 
participants to notice the differences among the voices. Pilot testing verified that the current 
method produced better voice learning than the original method. 
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The main experiment began with general instructions on the computer 
screen, indicating to participants that their gaze must be focused on the computer 
screen throughout the entire experiment in order to keep the program moving 
along at an acceptable pace. Participants then received a demonstration of a study 
trial (described below), and were encouraged to ask any clarification questions 
before beginning the experiment.  
 The study phase consisted of 80 trials, all proceeding as outlined in Figure 
5, with 20 trials per speaker. On each trial, participants first focused on a central 
fixation cross for 1500 ms. Following the offset of the fixation cross, two vertical 
and two horizontal lines divided the screen into a 9-box grid comprised of 
equally-sized cells (see Figure 5). After an inter-stimulus interval (ISI) of 250 ms, 
a word in 18-pt bold Arial font was presented in one of seven cells on the screen 
(items were never presented centrally or in the lower-middle box
3
). After 1000 
ms, the word disappeared and a star was presented in another cell for 750 ms. 
After the star disappeared, a face appeared in a third location on the screen and 
the spoken version of the word was played over the participants’ headphones in 
the voice paired to that face. Following the offset of the spoken word, participants 
viewed a blank screen for 2000 ms prior to the start of the next trial. 
The placement of items throughout the study trials was determined pseudo-
randomly, such that the locations were chosen from one of 5 possible “patterns,” 
constrained such that the face, the printed word, and the star were never presented 
                                                 
3 This constraint was added because participants tended to look at the central boxes in the middle 
and bottom rows during the test trials (the middle center box is the location of the fixation cross 
and the bottom center box is where participants look in anticipation of the source monitoring 
judgment). 
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in the same locations or in the same row (e.g., the word and the face could not 
both appear in the middle row during a single trial). Each pattern was used with 
















Figure 5. Schematic study trial. 
Experiment 1 
 Experiment 1 assessed the extent to which retrieval cues influence the 
degree of retrieval success, and whether eye movements are reinstated across 
learning and retrieval. During encoding, participants studied words spoken by 
four distinct speakers as they completed a series of predetermined eye movement 
patterns. Fixations and pupil diameters were monitored continuously throughout 
the study trials, ensuring that the patterns were being followed. In a subsequent 
item recognition and source monitoring task, participants were tested with old and 
new items spoken by two new speakers, each bearing different levels of similarity 
to the original voices. During retrieval, test items were presented auditorily while 
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only the 9-box grid was visible. That was meant to encourage eye movements. 
Further, by recording continuous measures of pupil diameter, I constructed bias-
free pupillary ROCs to examine the nature of recognition memory, broadly-
defined.  
Participants  
Eighty-six students were recruited from the undergraduate population at 
Arizona State University to participate in exchange for partial course credit or 
cash payment ($15). All participants had normal, or corrected-to-normal, vision 
and were native English speakers. Twelve participants were excluded prior to data 
analysis (three did not complete the voice familiarization phase, five were missing 
more than 7% of fixations
4
, and four had eye-tracking failures
5
), leaving 74 
participants in the remaining analyses. Thirty-eight participants were randomly 
assigned to HS and 36 were randomly assigned to LS. 
Test Procedures 
 Following a 3-minute break, participants were familiarized with the test 
instructions, which were similar to those given in standard source monitoring 
experiments. During each test trial, participants heard a word spoken over their 
headphones by one of the two test-speakers (assigned to test words randomly 
within the constraint that each test voice be used equally often with words spoken 
by the original speakers). After a 1000-ms ISI, participants heard a low-pitched 
                                                 
4 Seven percent was chosen as a cutoff because higher values typically yield extensive segments of 
missing data. With large segments of missing data, entire trials need to be dropped from analysis. 
5 Eye-tracking failures were equipment malfunctions, which resulted in large portions of missing 
data. 
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tone, which indicated that they should give their old/new recognition response
6
 
(item recognition). Regardless of the participants’ responses, they were always 
asked to indicate the name of the person who spoke the word during study (source 
identification) by pressing one of four response keys corresponding to the location 
of the speaker (locations were changed on every trial). Participants were 
instructed to guess the source if they could not remember, or if they judged the 
item to be new. This was intended to reveal source information in the absence of 
item memory (as in Kurilla & Westerman, 2010), as well as any response biases. 
No feedback was given.  
Results and Discussion 
 Across all three experiments reported here, pupil results were conducted 
on each participant’s “better eye” (defined as the eye with fewer missing 
observations). Missing observations were filled in by linear interpolation 
(averaging the pupil diameter for 50-ms before and after the missing point). 
Response time (RT) measures were trimmed prior to analysis, by filtering 
outliers, defined as RTs falling 3 or more standard deviations above or below the 
mean. Alpha for all significance tests was set at .05, and multiple comparisons 
were Bonferroni-corrected. 
Item Recognition Analyses 
 Because item hit rates did not differ across the subordinate conditions (p > 
.05), they were collapsed into superordinate groups, HS and LS, for signal 
detection analyses. Participants’ sensitivity (d') and bias (c) were analyzed in 
                                                 
6 Note that the brief wait period was meant to encourage eye movements during memory retrieval.  
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separate 2-way ANOVAs. Although participants in the LS groups tended to have 
higher d' (M = .68, SE = .11), relative to the participants in the HS groups (M = 
.46, SE = .08), this difference was not reliable (p = .12). The groups also did not 
reliably differ in their response biases, p = .87. Neither the bias estimate for the 
LS group (M = .11, SE = .08), nor the HS group (M = .09, SE = .07), differed 
reliably from zero, both ps > .05. 
 To examine the influence of test voice on item recognition, hit rates were 
analyzed in a 4 (Condition: HS1/HS2/LS1/LS2) x 2 (Test Gender: 
Different/Same) mixed model, repeated measures (RM) ANOVA
7
. Although 
there was a main effect of Test Gender, F(1, 70) = 15.92, p < .05, η2p = .19, this 
effect was qualified by an interaction with Condition, F(3, 70) = 4.45, p = .01, η2p 
= .16. Pairwise comparisons revealed that the locus of the effect was in the HS 
groups. When the gender of the test voice matched the gender of the studied 
voices, participants’ hit rates were reliably higher, relative to when they were 
changed. In HS1, participants studied words by male speakers; when the test 
speaker was also a male, hit rates were higher (M = .69, SE = .05), relative to 
when the test speaker was a female (M = .44, SE = .05). The reverse pattern was 
observed for HS2 (Msame = .62, SEsame = .05, Mdifferent = .44, SEdifferent = .05), 
suggesting that participants were biased to say “old” when the test gender 
matched the study gender. 
                                                 
7 In all analyses examining the influence of voice, HS and LS groups were analyzed by 
their separate subordinate conditions, because study voice gender differed across HS1 
and HS2. 
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 Complementary analyses were performed on correct rejection rates, to 
determine whether test voice gender also biased “new” responses. Once again, 
there was an interaction between Test Gender and Condition, F(3, 70) = 5.79, p = 
.001, η2p = .20. In the HS groups, participants were more accurate when rejecting 
items spoken in the opposite gender of the studied words. In HS1, participants 
correctly rejected words spoken by a female (M = .67, SE = .05) more frequently 
than words spoken by a male (M = .48, SE = .06). The same pattern held for 
participants in HS2; “new” responses were more accurate when the test speaker 
was a male (M = .73, SE = .06), relative to a female (M = .53, SE = .05). In short, 
hit and correct rejection rates indicated that test voices had a clearly biasing effect 
on participants’ responses. When the test voice matched the superficial 
characteristics of the studied voice, participants were biased to respond “old;” the 
reverse held when the test voice did not match the characteristics of the studied 
voice.  
Source-Monitoring Analyses 
To determine whether the test voice influenced source recognition 
performance, I analyzed source hit rates in a 4 (Condition) x 2 (Test Gender) 
mixed model, RM ANOVA. Once again, the main effect of Test Gender, F(1, 70) 
= 62.85, p < .05, η2p = .47, was qualified by an interaction with Condition, F(3, 
70) = 19.11, p < .05, η2p = .45. As can be seen in Figure 6, participants’ source 
decisions were only influenced by the gender of the test speaker in the LS 
conditions. Regardless of the gender of the study speaker, when the gender of the 
test speaker matched, participants’ source decisions were more accurate, relative 
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to when the gender of the test speaker did not match. For example, in LS1, 
participants recalled the correct source more often (M = .48, SE = .02) when the 
study and test genders were the same, relative to when the study and test genders 
differed (M = .19, SE = .04). This is another bias effect, as was evident in the 
source hit rates. When participants were able to use gender to narrow down the 


















Figure 6. Source recognition rates by Group, as a function of test speaker. Error 
bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
To examine source-monitoring performance more precisely, participants’ 
behavioral responses were sorted into a 5 x 5 table, with rows corresponding to 
the true source and the columns corresponding to the chosen source. Appendix B 
contains the 5 x 5 frequency tables summarized across participants in each of the 
four conditions, and Appendix C contains complementary tables displayed in 
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percentages. For each participant, I calculated a specific-source identification 
(SSI) score and a partial-source identification (PSI) score (see Appendix D for the 
formulae, which were derived from those provided by Dodson et al., 1998). The 
SSI represents the probability of recalling the specific source (e.g., recognizing 
that Chloe was the original speaker). The PSI score represents the probability of 
recognizing the correct gender of the original speaker, in the absence of specific 
source recognition (e.g., selecting Anne, rather than Erik or Steve, when the 
original speaker was Chloe). Both scores are centered at zero, representing chance 
level decisions. Scores above zero reflect more accurate responses (e.g., a PSI 
score above zero reflects greater likelihood of selecting a same-gender, yet 
technically incorrect, source). 
To examine specific source monitoring performance, conditions were 
collapsed into groups, HS and LS, because source monitoring performance did 
not differ across like-conditions (e.g., LS1 versus LS2). SSI scores were analyzed 
in a 2 (Group: HS/LS) x 2 (Item Recognition: Hit/Miss) mixed model, RM 
ANOVA. Data from three participants (two in HS and one in LS) were excluded 
for response frequencies of zero. There was a marginal effect of group (p = .059), 
reflecting slightly more accurate performance by the LS group (M = .32, SE = 
.01), relative to the HS group (M = .28, SE = .01). Item recognition performance 
had a reliable effect on SSI scores, F(1, 69) = 16.98, p < .05, η2p = .20. When 
participants correctly recognized the item, they were also more likely to retrieve 
specific source information (M = .33, SE = .02), relative to when they did not 
recognize an old item (M = .26, SE = .01). Although SSI was larger when 
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participants were able to recognize items, it should be noted that one-sample t-
tests, comparing the item correct and item incorrect SSI scores to zero, indicated 
that both values were reliably above zero, both ps < .05. Regardless of item 
memory, participants were able to retrieve specific source details. 
Because participants in the HS groups could not, by design, have partial 
source information based on speaker gender, PSI scores were only analyzed in the 
LS groups (one participant was excluded for missing data) in a 2-way ANOVA 
comparing scores by whether or not the item was recognized. Item Recognition 
affected PSI scores, F(1, 35) = 20.18, p < .05, η2p = .37, but in the opposite 
direction of the SSI scores. Failing to recognize an old item yielded above-chance 
partial source recognition (M = .52, SE = .06). When participants correctly 
recognized items, they were less likely to recall partial source information (M = 
.16, SE = .04)
8
. Note that, although the PSI was larger during item incorrect trials, 
relative to item correct trials, one-sample t-tests comparing the values to zero 
indicate that both conditions are associated with PSI scores reliably above zero, 
both ps < .05. This finding is consistent with previously-reported findings of 
partial source memory (Dodson et al., 1998) and source memory in the absence of 
item memory (Kurilla & Westerman, 2010). Because participants’ eye 
movements were monitored during encoding, it is unlikely that they were not 
attending to the events as presented, suggesting that dual-process explanations of 
partial source memory reflecting incomplete encoding are not applicable. Rather, 
                                                 
8 This is a reflection of the prior analysis, which indicated that participants were more 
likely to recall source-specific information following correct item recognition.  
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recollection seems to follow a continuous retrieval process, capable of eliciting 
partial and specific source memories.  
Response Time Analyses  
 To determine whether the specificity of participants’ memories influenced 
their speed of responding, RTs during correct item and source recognitions were 
analyzed in separate ANOVAs. Item recognition RTs were analyzed in a 2 
(Group) x 2 (Source Recognition) mixed model, RM ANOVA. No reliable main 
effects or interactions emerged, all ps > .05. Source recognition RTs were 
analyzed in a 2 (Group) x 2 (Item Recognition) mixed model, RM ANOVA. 
Participants in the LS group responded more quickly (M = 1411 ms, SE = 98) 
than participants in the HS group (M = 1832 ms, SE = 95), F(1, 72) = 9.6, p = 
.003, η2p = .12. This main effect was qualified by an interaction with Item 
Recognition, F(1, 72) = 5.09, p = .03, η2p = .07. Pairwise comparisons revealed 
that participants in the LS group responded to source questions more quickly 
following incorrect item recognitions (M = 1335 ms, SE = 105), relative to correct 
item recognitions (M = 1486 ms, SE = 102). Although it is possible that 
participants responded more quickly following incorrect item responses because 
they assumed that they were guessing, the effect size is relatively small and does 
not replicate across the remaining experiments. As such, this effect will not 
receive further attention.  
 Source RTs were also analyzed in the LS group by the specificity of the 
source memories in a 3-way (Source Memory: Full/Partial/None) ANOVA.  No 
reliable effects emerged, p = .65. Overall, the RT analyses from Experiment 1 
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indicate that participants responded more quickly to the source discrimination 
when that discrimination is objectively easier, in the LS groups.  
Pupillary ROC Analyses 
 For each participant, the mean and range of pupil diameters were 
calculated during test trials, allowing the range to be segmented by the standard 
deviation of the distribution. Because pilot data indicated that higher confidence 
estimates were associated with enlarged pupils, the relationship between pupil 
size and “confidence” was positive for old test trials and negative for new test 
trials. To create confidence “bins,” the highest confidence estimate (“6”) was 
associated with pupil diameters 1.5 or more standard deviations above the mean. 
A “5” was associated with pupil diameters at least 1 standard deviation above the 
mean, and so forth, in one-half standard deviation increments. As mentioned, this 
pattern was reversed for “new” trials.  Response frequencies, cumulative response 
proportions, and z-scores for the ROC data can be found in Appendix E. Note that 
no subjects from LS2 were included in any ROC analysis, due to a programming 
error, which resulted in loss of eye-tracking data collection during “new” trials. 
 ROCs and z-ROCs are presented in Figure 7, with separate lines for the 
HS and LS groups. The points within each graph were fit with quadratic equations 
(the summary statistics are presented in Table 2), but subject-level statistics were 
used to analyze the characteristics of the curves. None of the ROC statistics (e.g., 
quadratic constants, slope, intercept) differed between the HS and LS groups, as 
indicated by one-way ANOVAs, all ps > .05. The quadratic constants of the lines 
fit to the ROC data were reliably different from zero, t(58) = -14.49, p < .05. The 
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variance accounted for by a quadratic fit (97%) was reliably greater than the 
variance accounted for by a linear fit (94%), suggesting that the ROCs 


































Figure 7. Pupillary group ROCs (top panel) and z-ROCs (bottom panel) from 
Experiment 1. Both graphs are shown with the best-fitting quadratic lines.  
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Table 2 
 
Statistics for pupillary ROCs and z-ROCs in Experiment 1. 
 
           ROCs          z-ROCs 
  Quadratic     Quadratic 
Group  Constant        Slope                     Constant         Slope              
 
LS Group     -1.03 (.07)         1.90 (.08)            -0.03 (.01)         .83 (.02)  
HS Group     -1.01 (.10)         1.94 (.11)            -0.06 (.01)         .86 (.01) 
 
 
In the z-ROCs, quadratic and linear lines were again fit to the points. None 
of the points on the HS and LS lines differed in one-way ANOVAs. Although the 
quadratic constants for the z-ROCs were different from zero, t(58) = -6.55, p < 
.05, and therefore violated Hilford et al.’s (2002) second regularity of item 
recognition ROCs (i.e., that z-ROCs should be rectilinear), it is worth noting that 
these differences were relatively small. In fact, the variance accounted for by a 
linear solution (98%) increased marginally (but statistically reliably) when a 
quadratic fit was adopted (98.1%), t(58) = -2.26, p = .03, Cohen's d = 0.28. This 
pattern, and the small effect size, suggest that the functions are largely linear, 
consistent with the predictions of UVSD. Further support for UVSD comes from 
the slopes of the z-ROCs; the slopes for both HF and LF words were reliably 
below 1.0, t(58) = -19.26, p < .05, suggesting that the target distribution had a 
greater standard deviation than the lure distribution. 
Eye Movement Analyses 
 Research has revealed that eye movements precede conscious recollection, 
and are preferentially guided to old locations or items within 500-ms of stimulus 
onset (Moscovitch, 2008; Hannula & Ranganath, 2009). As such, eye movements 
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were analyzed during the test phase only, during predefined “interest periods” 
consisting of the time between the initiation of the test word and the completion 
of the old/new item response. Fixations were defined as moments when the eyes 
remained in a 100-pixel area for at least 100-ms (as in Goldinger, He, & Papesh, 
2009). Once a fixation was established, it was labeled according to what was on-
screen during the corresponding study trial. For example, if the study pattern 
involved cells 1, 6, and 9, those cells were labeled “regions of interest” (ROIs) 
during the test trial for that word (cells 2, 3, 4, and 7 would therefore be “non-
regions of interest”).  
 Eye movements were first analyzed by examining raw fixation rates 
during “old” test trials that were directed to ROIs or non-ROIs in a 2 (Fixation 
location: ROI/non-ROI) x 2 (Group) mixed model ANOVA. There was a 
marginal main effect of Group, F(1, 72) = 3.73, p = .057, η2p = .05, revealing that 
participants in the HS group made more fixations (M = 114, SE = 10) than 
participants in the LS group (M = 87, SE = 10).  There was also a main effect of 
Fixation Location, F(1, 72) = 6.21, p = .01, η2p = .08. Although ROIs comprised 
only three cells, and non-ROIs comprised four, 107 (SE = 8) total fixations were 
directed to ROIs, whereas 94 (SE = 7) were directed to non-ROIs. 
 This finding was complemented by an analysis on the proportions of 
fixations (per trial) directed to ROIs versus non-ROIs by Group. On average, 55% 
of fixations during “old” trials were directed to ROIs, whereas 45% were directed 
to non-ROIs, F(1, 72) = 16.21, p < .05, η2p = .18. By chance, participants would 
be expected to fixate in ROIs 43% of the time. In reality, they fixated within those 
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areas 55% of the time, which was reliably greater than chance, t(73) = 9.69, p < 
.01. This finding is consistent with previously-documented accounts of 
spontaneously reinstated eye movements during memory retrieval (e.g., Laeng & 
Todorescu, 2007; Spivey & Geng, 2000). 
Fixation durations were analyzed in a 2 (Group) x 2 (Fixation Location: 
ROI/non-ROI) mixed model, RM ANOVA. There was no reliable effect of Group 
on fixation duration, p = .99. There were, however, reliable effects of Fixation 
Location on the duration of participants’ fixations. When fixating within an ROI, 
participants’ fixations were longer (M = 498 ms, SE = 18), relative to when 
fixating within a non-ROI (M = 453, SE = 16), F(1, 72) = 5.42, p = .02, η2p = .07. 
This suggests that participants not only completed more fixations to ROIs, but 
that they spent significantly more time within those areas prior to making a 
response. Research on eye movement rates (to nothing) during memory retrieval 
find similar effects (see Hannula et al., 2011). Fixation durations within ROIs and 
non-ROIs were also compared to average fixations during “new” trials in separate 
paired-samples t-tests, collapsing across group
9
. No reliable differences were 
observed, both ps > .05. 
 To determine whether reinstated fixations were associated with more 
accurate item memory, the proportion of fixations to ROIs was analyzed in a 
paired-samples t-test, comparing hits to misses. No reliable difference emerged, 
t(72) = -.59, p = .56. A separate paired samples t-test was conducted on 
refixations by source accuracy (correct versus incorrect). When participants 
                                                 
9 New trials were not included in the initial analysis to avoid missing data. As mentioned earlier, 
LS2 participants’ eye-tracking data during new trials was not recorded.  
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correctly identified the original speaker, they were more likely to engage in 
refixations (M = .43, SE = .02), relative to when they were unable to recall the 
original speaker (M = .39, SE = .01), t(72) = -2.61. p = .01. A one-way ANOVA 
revealed that this effect was not sensitive to the detail of source memories (e.g., 
full versus partial) in the LS group, p = .25. Although some theories (e.g., 
O’Regan, 1992) suggest that NVGPs are epiphenomenal, and reflect the fact that 
there are no internal memory representations, the finding that accurate source 
memory was reliably associated with increased fixation rates to ROIs provides 
initial evidence to the contrary. When participants retrieve detailed memories, 
they tend to fixate within previously-viewed locations.  
 It is also possible that reinstated eye movements reflect the speed with 
which memory processes resolve. As such, participants’ proportion of fixations to 
ROIs on each trial were quartiled, and labeled as high (>.75), mid-high (>.50), 
mid-low (>.25), and low (<=.25). RTs during item recognition responses and 
source judgments were analyzed in separate 2 (Group) x 4 (Fixation Proportion) 
mixed model, RM ANOVAs. Because both item and source responses were 
prompted, no differences were expected to emerge. For item RTs, no differences 
were observed by Group, p = .22, but there was a reliable main effect of Fixation 
Proportion, F(1, 68) = 17.22, p < .05, η2p = .20. As shown in the left panel of 
Figure 8, participants responded more quickly during high and low fixation 
proportion trials. The same effect emerged in analyses on source RTs, F(1, 68) = 
49.63, p < .05, η2p = .42. As shown in the right panel of Figure 8, participants’ 
source judgments were faster following both high and low fixation proportions. 
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The RT results reveal an interesting pattern. Specifically, RTs are faster 
during item and source judgments when the rate of reinstated eye movements is 
very low or very high. RTs during the intermediate levels are relatively slow. This 
pattern suggests, potentially, two memory processes at work, one fast, automatic 
process, and one slow, deliberate process. Although it is tempting to equate these 
processes to familiarity and recollection, respectively, the rates of fixations within 
ROIs suggest that accurate source memory is associated with higher rates of 
reinstated eye movements. If source memory is primarily characterized by 
recollection, and those memories are also associated with higher rates of 
reinstated eye movements, then those memories are also retrieved more quickly, 




















































Figure 8. RTs during item responses (left panel) and source judgments (right 
panel) by the proportion of fixations directed to ROIs in Experiment 1. Error bars 
represent standard error. 
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Experiment 2 
 Given the finding in eye movements from Experiment 1 (namely that 
participants spontaneously reinstated encoding fixations, which were associated 
with more accurate source memories), Experiment 2 aimed to assess whether 
these refixations could be externally-cued to influence memory processes. By 
requiring participants to fixate in regions of interest (or non-regions of interest) 
prior to hearing a retrieval cue, I tested whether item and source memory are 
aided or disrupted by non-spontaneous eye movements.  
Participants  
Fifty-six students were recruited from the undergraduate population at 
Arizona State University to participate in exchange for partial course credit or 
cash payment ($15). All participants had normal, or corrected-to-normal, vision 
and were native English speakers. Eight participants were excluded prior to data 
analysis (three did not finish within a 90-minute time-frame, two did not complete 
the voice familiarization phase, one never responded “new” during the test trials, 
one never responded “old,” and one had greater than 7% missing fixations), 
leaving 48 participants in the remaining analyses. Twenty-three participants were 
randomly assigned to the HS conditions and 25 were assigned to the LS 
conditions.  
Test Procedures  
Following the 3-minute break, participants received verbal test 
instructions. Unlike Experiment 1, participants completed a single fixation for 
1000-ms prior to hearing the test word. Fifty percent of their fixations preceding 
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“old” trials were directed to one of two ROIs, the original location of the word 
(item location) or the original location of the face (source location). The 
remaining 50% of fixations were directed to one of the unused locations; all 
fixations preceding “new” trials were random. All other response characteristics 
were the same as Experiment 1.  
Results and Discussion 
Item Recognition Analyses 
 Participants’ d' and c were analyzed in separate 2-way ANOVAs. 
Although participants in the LS groups had higher d' (M = .59, SE = .11), relative 
to the participants in the HS groups (M = .38, SE = .12), this difference was not 
reliable, p = .19. The groups also did not reliably differ in their response biases, p 
= .87. Response biases in the LS group (M = .10, SE = .10) did not differ from 
zero, p = .25, but those in the HS group (M = .16, SE = .06) were reliably above 
zero, p = .02, indicating that HS participants had a conservative response bias.  
 To examine the influence of test voice on item recognition, hit rates were 
analyzed in a 4 (Condition: HS1/HS2/LS1/LS2) x 2 (Test Gender: 
Different/Same) mixed model, RM ANOVA. The interaction between Condition 
and Test Gender was marginally significant, F(3, 44) = 2.65, p = .06, η2p = .15. 
Pairwise comparisons revealed that participants in HS1 were reliably affected by 
the test voice gender, such that male voices yielded more hits (M = .65, SE = .06), 
relative to female voices (M = .45, SE = .06). Because participants in HS1 studied 
words spoken by all male speakers, hearing a male voice at test biased them to 
call the item “old.”  
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 The complementary finding in correct rejection rates was observed in a 4 
(Condition) x 2 (Test Gender) mixed model, RM ANOVA. Test Gender and 
Condition interacted, F(3, 44) = 3.52, p = .02, η2p = .19, such that participants in 
the HS conditions more accurately rejected new items when the test speaker was 
opposite in gender from the study speakers. In HS1, participants more correctly 
rejected words spoken by a female (M = .68, SE = .07), relative to a male (M = 
.47, SE = .07). The same pattern held for participants in HS2; “new” responses 
were more accurate when the test speaker was a male (M = .70, SE = .08), relative 
to a female (M = .59, SE = .08).   
Source-Monitoring Analyses 
To determine whether the test voice influenced source recognition 
performance, I analyzed source hit rates in a 4 (Condition) x 2 (Test Gender) 
mixed model, RM ANOVA. Once again, the main effect of Test Gender, F(1, 44) 
= 44.59, p < .05, η2p = .50, was qualified by an interaction with Condition, F(3, 
44) = 19.5, p < .05, η2p = .57. As can be seen in Figure 9, participants’ source 
decisions were only influenced by the gender of the test speaker in the LS 
conditions. As in the LS conditions in Experiment 1, when the gender of the test 
speaker matched that of the study speaker, participants’ source decisions were 
more accurate, relative to when the two genders did not match. This effect 
occurred across both male and female study speakers, suggesting that 
participants’ memories contained some degree of episodic voice detail.  
 
 



















Figure 9. Source recognition rates by Group, as a function of test speaker. Error 
bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
To determine whether the test voice influenced source recognition 
performance, I analyzed source hit rates in a 4 (Condition) x 2 (Test Gender) 
mixed model, RM ANOVA. Once again, the main effect of Test Gender, F(1, 44) 
= 44.59, p < .05, η2p = .50, was qualified by an interaction with Condition, F(3, 
44) = 19.5, p < .05, η2p = .57. As can be seen in Figure 9, participants’ source 
decisions were only influenced by the gender of the test speaker in the LS 
conditions. As in the LS conditions in Experiment 1, when the gender of the test 
speaker matched that of the study speaker, participants’ source decisions were 
more accurate, relative to when the two genders did not match. This effect 
occurred across both male and female study speakers, suggesting that 
participants’ memories contained some degree of episodic voice detail.  
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As in Experiment 1, participants’ behavioral responses were sorted into a 
5 x 5 table, with rows corresponding to the true source and the columns 
corresponding to the chosen source (see Appendix F for frequency tables, and 
Appendix G for percentages). To examine specific source monitoring 
performance, participants’ SSI scores were analyzed in a 2 (Group: HS/LS) x 2 
(Item Recognition: Hit/Miss) mixed model, RM ANOVA. Data from one HS 
participant was excluded for at least one response frequency of zero. As in 
Experiment 1, item recognition performance had a reliable effect on SSI scores, 
F(1, 45) = 11.83, p = .001, η2p = .21. When participants correctly recognized 
items, they were also more likely to retrieve specific source information (M = .33, 
SE = .02), relative to when they did not recognize old items (M = .24, SE = .01).  
LS participants’ PSI scores were analyzed in a 2-way (Item Recognition) 
ANOVA. Participants’ item recognition performance affected PSI scores, F(1, 24) 
= 33.06, p < .05, η2p = .58, replicating the finding from Experiment 1. Failure to 
recognize old items yielded partial source recollection (M = .69, SE = .07); 
participants recalled the gender of the speaker without recalling the specific name. 
The PSI score was reliably lower when participants correctly recognized old items 
(M = .18, SE = .04).  
Response Time Analyses  
 As in Experiment 1, item recognition RTs were unaffected by Group or 
subsequent source recognition, as confirmed by a 2 (Group) x 2 (Source 
Recognition) mixed model, RM ANOVA, all ps > .05. RTs during correct source 
recognitions were also analyzed in a 2 (Group) x 2 (Item Recognition) mixed 
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model, RM ANOVA. Participants in the LS group respond more quickly (M = 
1404 ms, SE = 93) than participants in the HS group (M = 1788 ms, SE = 99), 
F(1, 45) = 7.92, p = .007, η2p = .15. No other main effects or interactions were 
reliable. Additional analyses on source RTs in the LS group revealed no effect of 
source memory detail (full/partial/none) in a 3-way ANOVA, p = .96.  
 The RT results replicated those from Experiment 1. Specifically, 
participants’ source retrieval time was affected by the global difficulty of the task, 
such that those in the LS group responded to the source discrimination prompt 
more quickly than those in the HS group.  
Pupillary ROC Analyses 
 Pupillary ROCs were constructed in the same manner as Experiment 1, 
and detailed statistics are presented in Appendix H. In this experiment, however, 
all participants in all conditions were included in the analyses.  
ROCs and z-ROCs are presented in Figure 10, with separate trend lines for 
the HS and LS groups. The points within each graph were fit with quadratic 
equations (see Table 3 for summary statistics), but subject-level statistics were 
used to analyze the characteristics of the curves. None of the ROC statistics (e.g., 
quadratic constants, slope, intercept) differed between the HS and LS groups, as 
indicated by one-way ANOVAs, all ps > .05. The quadratic constants of the lines 
fit to the ROC data were reliably different from zero, t(44) = -12.28, p < .05. 
Further, the variance accounted for by a quadratic fit (98%) was reliably greater 
than the variance accounted for by a linear fit (95%), suggesting that the ROCs 
were curvilinear, t(44) = -9.95, p < .05, Cohen's d = 1.28. This finding is 
  70 
consistent with single-process, signal-detection views of episodic memory, which 

















Figure 10. Pupillary group ROCs (left panel) and z-ROCs (right panel) from 
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Table 3 
 
Statistics for pupillary ROCs and z-ROCs in Experiment 2. 
 
           ROCs          z-ROCs 
  Quadratic     Quadratic 
Group  Constant        Slope                     Constant         Slope              
 
LS Group     -1.51 (.17)         2.38 (.11)              -0.14 (.07)         .95 (.04)  
HS Group     -1.22 (.13)         2.06 (.17)              -0.05 (.03)         .97 (.05) 
 
 
To examine the z-ROCs, quadratic and linear lines were fit to the points. 
Between the HS and LS groups, none of the equation parameters differed in one-
way ANOVAs, ps > .05. Although the quadratic constants for the z-ROCs were 
different from zero, t(44) = -2.44, p = .02, violating the regularity that z-ROCs are 
rectilinear (Hilford et al., 2002), these differences were relatively small. The 
variance accounted for by a linear solution (96.2%) increased marginally (but 
statistically reliably) when a quadratic fit was adopted (97.6%), t(44) = -5.06, p < 
.05, Cohen's d = 0.64. This pattern suggests that the functions are predominantly 
linear, yet more curved than Experiment 1. Also inconsistent with UVSD, the 
slope of the line through the z-ROCs (.96) does not reliably differ from 1.0, t(44) 
= -1.21, p = .23, suggesting that the strength distribution of targets and lures is 
consistent with equal-variance models. 
Eye Movement Analyses 
 To determine whether reinstated single fixations influence item 
recognition performance, participants’ hit rates were analyzed in a 2 (Group) x 3 
(Fixation Location: Item/New/Source) mixed model, RM ANOVA. No reliable 
effects emerged, all ps > .05. 
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 In Experiment 1, refixations were associated with accurate source 
recognition performance; as such, source hit rates were analyzed in a 2 (Group) x 
2 (Item Recognition) x 3 (Fixation Location) mixed model, RM ANOVA. Only 
the main effect of Item Recognition was reliable, F(1, 45) = 16.25, p < .05, η2p = 
.27. Consistent with earlier analyses, correct item recognition was associated with 
correct source recognition.  
 To examine whether reinstated fixations affected the specificity of source 
memories, partial source recognition performance (defined as choosing the correct 
source gender in the absence of correct specific source recall in LS groups) was 
analyzed in a 2 (Item Recognition) x 3 (Fixation Location) RM ANOVA. No 
reliable effects or interactions were observed.  
 In Experiment 1, participants’ item and source RTs were facilitated by 
very frequent and very infrequent rates of fixations to ROIs. This was not the case 
in Experiment 2. Participants RTs during item and source judgments were 
analyzed in separate 2 (Group) x 3 (Fixation Location) mixed model, RM 
ANOVAs. No reliable effects emerged, all ps > .05  
Experiment 3 
 Experiment 1 revealed that participants spontaneously refixate upon 
previously-viewed locations during a memory retrieval task with no visual 
demands. Experiment 2, however, revealed that completing externally-cued 
fixations to relevant or irrelevant screen locations did not influence item or source 
memory. Part of the discrepancy between these two findings could reflect the fact 
that participants completed multiple spontaneous refixations in Experiment 1, 
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whereas they completed only a single fixation in Experiment 2. It is possible that 
memory traces for encoding experiences include the motoric component of the 
eye movement series, and that cueing a single piece of that component is 
insufficient to elicit a change in memorial experience. As such, Experiment 3 
investigated the role of full motor processes, not just fixations, in the formation 
and retrieval of source memories. In this experiment, participants were required to 
complete a series of eye movements prior to the presentation of the test stimulus. 
By manipulating the oculomotor program during retrieval, I assessed the 
functional role of eye movement sequences during retrieval from memory. 
Participants  
Sixty-two students were recruited from the undergraduate population at 
Arizona State University to participate in exchange for partial course credit or 
cash payment ($15). All participants had normal, or corrected-to-normal, vision 
and were native English speakers. Five participants were excluded prior to data 
analysis (three were missing more than 7% fixations, one never responded “new” 
during the test trials, and one never responded “old”), leaving 57 participants in 
the remaining analyses. Twenty-five participants were randomly assigned to HS, 
and 32 were randomly assigned to LS. 
Test Procedures  
During the test phase of Experiment 3, participants reinstated entire 
fixation patterns. Prior to hearing each test word, participants completed three 
fixations, guided by a star-shaped figure, for 750-ms each. Fixation patterns 
during old trials could fall into one of four categories: Full reinstatement 
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(participants completed the same series of fixations during retrieval as during 
encoding), item reinstatement (participants completed two random fixations and 
one directed to the original location of the printed word), source reinstatement 
(participants completed two random fixations and one directed to the original 
location of the face), or new pattern (participants completed a new series of 
fixations). Each pattern type was used equally often with old and new items 
(although, by design, all patterns are “new” during new test trials). All other 
response characteristics were the same as Experiment 1.  
Results and Discussion 
Item Recognition Analyses  
 Participants’ d' and c were analyzed in separate 2-way ANOVAs. 
Participants in the LS groups had higher d' (M = .59, SE = .11), relative to the 
participants in the HS groups (M = .22, SE = .06), F(1, 55) = 7.09, p = .01. The 
groups did not reliably differ in their response biases, p = .49. Bias in the LS 
group (M = .13, SE = .06) was marginally different from zero, p = .05, indicating 
that those participants were somewhat conservatively biased. Bias in the HS 
group (M = .07, SE = .08) did not differ from zero, p > .05. 
 To examine the influence of test voice on item recognition, hit rates were 
analyzed in a 4 (Condition: HS1/HS2/LS1/LS2) x 2 (Test Gender: 
Different/Same) mixed model, RM ANOVA. Unlike the previous experiments, 
the gender of the test voice did not influence responding, F(1, 53) = 2.97, p = .09,  
η2p = .05. No effects or interactions were reliable. Similarly, the gender of the test 
voice did not influence participants’ ability to correctly reject new items. No 
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effects or interactions in a 4 (Condition) x 2 (Test Gender) RM ANOVA on 
correct rejection rates were reliable, all ps > .05. 
Source-Monitoring Analyses 
To determine whether the test voice influenced source recognition 
performance, I analyzed source hit rates in a 4 (Condition) x 2 (Test Gender) 
mixed model, RM ANOVA. The main effect of Test Gender, F(1, 53) = 33.54, p 
< .05, η2p = .39, was qualified by an interaction with Condition, F(3, 53) = 11.82, 
p < .05, η2p = .40. As can be seen in Figure 11, participants’ source decisions were 
only influenced by the gender of the test speaker in the LS conditions. When the 
gender of the test voice matched the gender of the study voice, participants’ 
source judgments were more accurate. Although participants had no reason to 
assume that the gender of the test speaker was diagnostic (in LS conditions, two 
study speakers were male and two were female), when that gender matched the 
study gender, participants were better able to correctly identify the original 
speaker. As in Experiments 1 and 2, this is interpreted as a bias effect: 
Participants used the test gender to narrow the field of response options from four 
to two. As can be seen in Figure 11, LS participants’ performance when the test 
speaker was the same-gender as the studied speaker did not differ reliably from 
















Figure 11. Source recognition rates by Group, as a function of test speaker. Error 
bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
Behavioral responses were sorted into a 5 x 5 frequency table, with rows 
corresponding to the true source and the columns corresponding to the chosen 
source (see Appendix I for the frequency tables, and Appendix J for the tables 
expressed as percentages). To examine specific source monitoring performance, 
participants’ SSI scores were analyzed in a 2 (Group: HS/LS) x 2 (Item 
Recognition: Hit/Miss) mixed model, RM ANOVA. As in Experiments 1 and 2, 
item recognition performance had a reliable effect on SSI scores, F(1, 55) = 
13.47, p = .001, η2p = .20. When participants correctly recognized items, they 
were also more likely to retrieve specific source information (M = .32, SE = .01), 
relative to when they did not recognize old items (M = .26, SE = .01). As 
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confirmed by one-sample t-tests, both values were reliably above zero, both ps < 
.05. 
LS participants’ PSI scores were analyzed in a 2-way (Item Recognition) 
ANOVA, which revealed that Item Recognition reliably affected PSI scores, F(1, 
31) = 41.91, p < .05, η2p = .58. When participants were unable to correctly 
recognize old items, they nevertheless demonstrated partial source recollection (M 
= .69, SE = .07). When they correctly recognized items, however, they were less 
likely to recall partial source information (M = .21, SE = .04). Both PSI estimates 
are reliably above zero, as confirmed by one-sample t-tests, both ps < .05. This is 
consistent with findings from Experiments 1 and 2. Overall, this establishes that 
partial source memory in the absence of accurate item memory is a reliable and 
replicable effect, and exists contrary to the predictions of many dual-process 
accounts of memory. Whereas dual-process theories assume that recollection 
reflects high-confidence, all-or-none recollection, these data indicate that 
recollection can occur even with relatively low item strength (otherwise, 
participants would have correctly recognized the items). This finding cannot be 
accommodated by existing dual-process accounts, but is easily predicted and 
explained by single-process, signal-detection theories (e.g., Starns et al., 2008).  
Response Time Analyses 
 A 2 (Group) x 2 (Source Recognition) analysis on correct item RTs 
revealed no reliable interactions or main effects, all ps > .05, consistent with the 
previous two experiments. As in Experiments 1 and 2, a 2 (Group) x 2 (Item 
Recognition) mixed model, RM ANOVA on correct source RTs revealed that 
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participants in the LS group responded more quickly (M = 1465 ms, SE = 77) than 
participants in the HS group (M = 1802 ms, SE = 87), F(1, 55) = 8.44, p = .005, 
η2p = .13. A main effect of Item Recognition, F(1, 55) = 5.22, p = .03, η
2
p = .09, 
revealed that participants responded to the source judgment more quickly when 
they recognized the item (M = 1517 ms, SE = 82), relative to when they did not 
recognize the item (M = 1750 ms, SE = 72).  The interaction was not reliable. 
Additional analyses on source RTs in the LS group revealed no effect of source 
memory specificity (full/partial/none) in a 3-way ANOVA, p = .35. 
 The RT results from Experiment 3 replicate those from Experiments 1 and 
2. Specifically, judgment times were clearly affected by the overall difficulty of 
the task. When discriminating between four highly-similar sources, participants’ 
decision times were longer, relative to when discriminating between four less-
similar sources. In short, task difficulty influenced the accumulation of evidence 
in favor of one source over the others, as operationalized via RTs. 
Pupillary ROC Analyses 
 Pupillary ROCs were constructed in the same manner as Experiment 1, 
and detailed statistics are presented in Appendix K. All participants in all 
conditions were included in the analyses.  
ROCs and z-ROCs are presented in Figure 12, with separate lines for the 
HS and LS groups. The points within each graph were fit with quadratic equations 
(see Table 4 for summary statistics), but subject-level statistics were used to 
analyze the characteristics of the curves. None of the ROC statistics (e.g., 
quadratic constants, slope, intercept) differed between the HS and LS groups, as 
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indicated by one-way ANOVAs, all ps > .05. The quadratic constants of the lines 
fit to the ROC data were reliably different from zero, t(56) = -16.6, p < .05, 
suggesting curved lines. Further, the variance accounted for by a quadratic fit 
(97%) was reliably greater than the variance accounted for by a linear fit (94%), 
confirming that the ROCs were curved, t(56) = -12.45, p < .05, Cohen's d = 1.39. 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, this finding is consistent with single-process, signal-
detection views of recognition memory, and inconsistent with the predictions of 
dual-process theory. What the curved ROCs suggest is that memory retrieval can 
be accurate across degrees of memory strength (or confidence, or response bias). 
Dual-process theories predict that item and source ROCs should be linear, 
reflecting the function of a threshold-based recollection process, which is 
typically associated with the highest level of confidence or strength. This was not 
observed across any of the experiments reported here. 
To examine the z-ROCs, quadratic and linear lines were fit to the points. 
None of the equation parameters for the HS and LS lines differed in one-way 
ANOVAs, p > .05. The quadratic constants for the z-ROCs were different from 
zero, t(56) = -3.38, p = .001, suggesting that the lines were curvilinear. Moreover, 
the variance explained by a linear solution (96.2%) increased marginally (but 
statistically reliably) when a quadratic fit was adopted (97.7%), t(56) = -5.03, p < 
.05, Cohen's d = 0.70. This pattern suggests that the functions are somewhat 
curvilinear, in contrast with UVSD. To further examine the z-ROC predictions of 
UVSD, I analyzed the slope of the line through the functions (M = .94, SE = .02) 
in a one-sample t-test, comparing the values to 1.00. The analysis revealed that 
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the slopes were statistically reliably below 1.0, which is consistent with unequal 
variance and targets and lures, t(56) = -2.67, p = .01. Although this is consistent 
with UVSD predictions, the slightly curved functions are somewhat inconsistent. 
The discrepancy between the ROC and z-ROC results will be discussed further in 
the General Discussion, but across the three experiments reported here, the results 





















































Figure 12. Pupillary group ROCs (top panel) and z-ROCs (bottom panel) from 
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Table 4 
  
Statistics for pupillary ROCs and z-ROCs in Experiment 3. 
 
           ROCs          z-ROCs 
  Quadratic     Quadratic 
Group  Constant        Slope                     Constant         Slope              
 
LS Group     -1.31 (.09)         2.18 (.08)            -0.10 (.03)         .96 (.03)  
HS Group     -1.48 (.15)         2.28 (.11)            -0.14 (.06)         .92 (.03) 
 
 
Eye Movement Analyses  
 To determine whether reinstated fixation patterns influenced item 
recognition performance, participants’ hit rates were analyzed in a 2 (Group) x 4 
(Fixation Pattern: Full/Item/New/Source) mixed model, RM ANOVA. No reliable 
effects emerged, all ps > .05. 
 Source hit rates were also analyzed as a function of reinstated fixation 
patterns, in a 2 (Group) x 2 (Item Recognition) x 4 (Fixation Pattern) mixed 
model, RM ANOVA. Only the main effect of Item Recognition was reliable, F(1, 
53) = 10.44, p = .002, η2p = .17. Consistent with earlier analyses, correct item 
recognition was associated with correct source recognition. No effect of Fixation 
Pattern was observed, p = .40. 
 To examine whether reinstated fixation patterns affected the specificity of 
source memories, partial source recognition performance (i.e., as choosing the 
correct source gender in the absence of correct specific source recall in LS 
groups) was analyzed in a 2 (Item Recognition) x 4 (Fixation Pattern) RM 
ANOVA. No reliable effects or interactions were observed.  
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In Experiment 1, when participants fixated in ROIs very frequently (or 
very infrequently), their item and source judgments were faster, relatively to mid-
level fixation proportions. This finding did not occur in Experiment 2, when 
participants engaged in single fixations during retrieval, and it did not replicate 
here, in Experiment 3, when participants engaged in full fixation patterns at 
retrieval. Participants RTs during item and source judgments were analyzed in 
separate 2 (Group) x 3 (Fixation Location) mixed model, RM ANOVAs. No 
reliable effects emerged, all ps > .05.  
General Discussion 
 The present experiments were designed to address four general research 
aims, all of which were generally focused on elucidating the nature of recognition 
memory. In each experiment, participants completed a series of eye movements 
while encoding words spoken by one of four speakers. The speakers were selected 
to have a predetermined similarity relationship, both to each other, and with 
subsequent test speakers. Through this manipulation, I examined the influence of 
similarity on item and source memory (Research Aim 1). Further, participants in 
each experiment provided source judgments (i.e., they named the original 
speaker) even when they failed to provide accurate old/new item recognition 
responses. This method allowed me to examine degrees of specificity in source 
memories, irrespective of item memory (Research Aim 2). Third, by monitoring 
pupil diameter during retrieval, I constructed pupillary ROCs and z-ROCs, 
allowing me to make inferences about the broader conceptualization of 
recognition memory (Research Aim 3). Lastly, across experiments, participants’ 
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eye movements at retrieval were manipulated, such that they were consistent or 
inconsistent with the fixation patterns followed during encoding. This allowed me 
to determine whether reinstated eye movements are functional or necessary during 
memory retrieval (Research Aim 4).  
Research Aim 1: The Influence of Similarity  
Across all three experiments, overwhelming evidence suggested that voice 
similarity influenced memory responses. Although participants in the LS groups 
generally had higher d' estimates, relative to participants in the HS groups, this 
finding was only reliable in Experiment 3. In Experiments 1 and 2, d' did not 
reliably differ across the HS and LS groups. Despite this, the trend indicates that 
the global task difficulty, as defined by the similarity of the source voices, had 
some effect on participants’ ability to judge items as studied or not, even though 
voice information was not useful in determining whether items were old or new. 
In fact, results suggest that global difficulty affected discriminability, and not 
necessarily the rate of information accumulation. Evidence for this is found in the 
analyses of item RTs wherein no differences were observed between the LS and 
HS groups. This conclusion should be interpreted cautiously, however, as the 
trends were not consistently reliable, and part of the evidence is drawn from a null 
effect.  
Clearer differences were observed by examining the influence of voice 
more closely, although most of the effects apparently reflected strategic 
responding or response biases. For example, participants in the HS groups, who 
studied words by either all males or all females, were consistently biased by the 
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gender of the test speaker, both during old and new trials. When the test speaker’s 
gender matched the studied genders, participants’ hit rates were higher, relative to 
when the test speaker’s gender was the opposite of the studied genders. This 
pattern extended to new trials; higher correct rejection rates were associated with 
opposite gender test voices. In short, although participants were instructed to 
ignore the test voice, and told that it held no discriminative value for old/new 
status of the item, the voice detail was apparently too salient to ignore. Similarly, 
participants in the LS groups, who studied words by two males and two females, 
used voice detail to respond strategically during the source judgment. When 
presented with a male test voice, for example, participants seemed to narrow the 
response set down to only the two males, yielding a chance response rate of 50%, 
instead of 25%. The apparent “boost” to source memory when the gender detail 
matched across study and test was simply another bias effect: Source judgments 
in the LS groups did not cross chance levels of performance, using 50% to 
estimate chance.  
Although this research was intended to illuminate the role of similarity in 
item and source memory, with a working hypothesis that predicted increases in 
performance for the LS groups, the most reliable findings were bias effects. 
Although the effects were not as strong as intended, there were some non-bias 
effects in the current studies. For example, d’ was generally higher when 
similarity was low, and participants in the LS groups responded to the source 
judgment more quickly than participants in the HS groups. The d’ difference is 
most theoretically interesting. Whereas the difference in source RTs could be an 
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artifact of the response bias based on voice (i.e., LS participants had a reliable 
voice cue on every trial by which to narrow down the response options; those in 
HS only had that voice cue on half of the trials), the d’ difference suggests that 
global difficulty plays a role in item memory. This is similar to an effect reported 
by Dodson et al. (1998) using a similar paradigm. Participants in their high-
similarity conditions performed less well on old/new item recognition, relative to 
participants in their low-similarity conditions. Although this effect is in direct 
conflict with some studies, in which no effect of source similarity is observed on 
item memory (e.g., Bayen et al., 1996; Ferguson et al., 1992; Lindsay & Johnson, 
1991), it is consistent with other findings, in which item similarity influences 
old/new recognition performance (e.g., Nelson, Brooks, & Wheeler, 1975; 
Runquist, 1978). For example, when the conceptual similarity of items is high 
(e.g., all items are four-footed animals), old/new recognition performance suffers, 
relative to when those items are mixed with items from another conceptual 
category (Schmidt, 1985).  
Dodson et al. (1998) interpreted their observed differences in item 
memory performance across the HS and LS conditions, which was generally 
replicated here, as one of response bias: When participants are tasked with 
making more difficult source judgments, they are biased to respond “new.” That 
interpretation does not necessarily hold for the present findings. Whereas Dodson 
et al., only requested source judgments following “old” responses, I required 
source judgments for all items, with the goal of eliminating a “new” response 
bias. The d’ result reported here seems to reflect general task difficulty, rather 
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than strategic responding. Unfortunately, d’ was so low in the current experiments 
(and, in fact, never reached 1.0) that any differences in memory were likely 
diminished, and reflected in the inconsistency of the finding. Future work will aim 
to increase overall d’, which should increase the “space” within which to observe 
an effect. 
Research Aim 2: The Specificity of Source Memory 
 More theoretically meaningful data were observed by examining the 
specificity of participants’ source memories. The current experiments replicated 
and extended the findings of Dodson et al. (1998). Specifically, Dodson and 
colleagues observed partial source memories in the absence of specific source 
memories. Although they observed evidence that source recollection was best 
characterized as a continuous process, they interpreted their data within a 
modified multinomial model, which typically assumes threshold-like recollection. 
In their model, source memory occurs following one of three routes; it can be 
specific, partial and guessed, or absent and guessed. Although their multinomial 
model nicely described their data, it would have difficulty describing the current 
data. Specifically, multinomial models predict discrete cognitive states, each of 
which is dependent upon the preceding state (see Bayen, Murnane, & Erdfelder, 
1996; Dodson & Shimamura, 2000; Meiser & Bröder, 2002). For example, in 
Dodson et al.’s multinomial model, source memory, either specific or partial, can 
only occur following intact item memory. This is a product of their task: Source 
memory was only queried following “old” item responses. In the present research, 
I probed source memory following all item responses, which served two 
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functions: 1) It eliminated the bias to respond “new” to relatively weak memories, 
which would allow participants to skip the source judgment, and 2) it allowed an 
estimate of specific and partial source memory to be obtained in the absence of 
item memory. According to some authors (e.g., Kurilla & Westerman, 2010), this 
is a plausible outcome, as it relies on a continuous recollection process. Given the 
implicit assumption of some researchers who utilize discrete-state multinomial 
models (e.g., Batchelder & Riefer, 1990), however, this should not be possible, as 
source memory is contingent upon item memory.   
 In the current studies, specific and partial source identification rates were 
operationalized with specific source identification (SSI) scores and partial source 
identification (PSI) scores (see Dodson et al., 1998). As discussed earlier, both 
scores are centered at zero; values reliably above zero reflect more accurate 
responding (e.g., a PSI score above zero reflects above-chance partial-source 
recollection). Consistent with every known theory of memory, SSI scores were 
highest when item memory was intact. Inconsistent with several theories of 
memory, however, SSI scores were also above-chance when item memory failed. 
In other words, when participants were unable to recognize items, a fundamental 
step in discrete, threshold models of memory, they still demonstrated above-
chance ability to identify the specific source of the learned (but unrecognized) 
information.  
Further evidence for a continuous view of the recollection process was 
obtained in PSI scores. Regardless of whether participants were able to recognize 
the item, PSI scores were reliably above zero, revealing above-chance partial 
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source recollections. For example, participants may have failed to recall that the 
word pickle was originally spoken by Chloe, but, with above-chance frequency, 
they were able to respond to the source judgment with a within-gender error (e.g., 
responding “Anne”). In fact, PSI scores were higher when the participants were 
unable to recognize the item. Although memory strength was not sufficient to 
cross a hypothetical item recognition criterion, participants nonetheless 
demonstrated intact partial source memories. This finding is difficult to reconcile 
with dual-process theories and multinomial modeling approaches to source 
memory, both of which assume that recollection is either/or and that memories 
follow discrete stage-like processing. Recent multinomial source models, based 
on the assumption of continuous, rather than discrete, recollection processes seem 
capable of both predicting and explaining this finding. 
The multinomial model depicted in Figure 13 was originally described by 
Batchelder and Riefer (1990), but was adapted to the four-source case, with a 
partial source memory component, by Dodson et al. (1998). Visual inspection 
clearly demonstrates an assumption inherent to all standard multinomial models: 
Source recollection is only possible following “old” item judgments. In this 
model, old items are recognized with probably D1. Failing to recognize an old 
item occurs with probably 1 – D1, but participants can guess that an item is old 
with probably b. The outcomes of the various discrete memory processes can be 
observed by following the “branches” of the tree. For example, a participant can 
recognize an item (D1), yet fail to recall its original source (1 – d1). With 
probability Pa, the participant can recall partial source information, leading to 
  90 
either a correct guess (e1) of true source, Erik, or an incorrect guess (1 - e1) of the 
same-gender source, Art. The critical assumption of this sort of model, which 
differentiates it from signal-detection models, is that participants can only “guess” 
source information when they fail to retrieve the item (the [1 – D] pathways, and 
any pathway terminating in a ‘g’ parameter). Figure 14 shows an attempt to 
modify this model to suit the current paradigm, in which participants were 
assumed to have partial source memory (not guessing) in the absence of item 
memory. As can seen by examining the terminal responses and backtracking 
through the branches of this model, participants only guess when they fail to 
retrieve source information. In other words, this model assumes that participants’ 
memory responses are usually “informed;” responses rarely reflect guessing. This 
assumption is supported by the PSI and SSI scores in the current experiments. 
Participants’ responses indicated that their source judgments were usually at least 
partial recollections of the studied event. As can also be seen by examining this 
model, it is far too complex to be useful. In fact, attempts to simulate the current 
data with this model failed to converge upon a solution, either because behavioral 






































Figure 13. Multinomial processing tree model of specific and partial source 
memory during old (upper tree) and new (lower tree) recognition trials. D1 = 
probability of detection Erik items as old; d1 = probability of identifying the 
source of Erik items; ai = probability of guessing that a detected item is from 
source i; b = probability of guessing an item is old; gi = probability of guessing 
























Figure 14. Modified multinomial processing tree model of specific and partial 
source memory during old (upper tree) and new (lower tree) recognition trials. D1 
= probability of detection Erik items as old; d1 = probability of identifying the 
source of Erik items; P1 = probability of identifying the source of Erik items; e1 = 
probability of guessing the correct source of Erik items after identifying the 
gender; ai = probability of guessing that a detected item is from source i; b = 
probability of guessing an item is old; gi = probability of guessing that an 
undetected item is from source i. Adapted from Dodson et al. (1998). 
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Another possible reason for the failure of the model depicted in Figure 14 
is that it is an attempt to model a continuous recollection process with a model 
designed to handle discrete, threshold-like recollection. Recent models of source 
memory have begun to incorporate the principles of signal-detection theory (e.g., 
Banks, 2000; DeCarlo, 2003; Glanzer et al., 2004; Hilford et al., 2002; Qin et al., 
2001; Slotnick & Dodson, 2005; Slotnick et al., 2000; Starns et al., 2008), 
eliminating the need for the threshold assumption inherent in standard 
multinomial models. Wickens (2002) described a signal-detection model of 
source retrieval in which each source was represented by an equal-variance 
Gaussian distribution, as in equal-variance signal-detection models described 
earlier. According to this model, source discriminability is described by the 
overlap of the two distributions; the less overlap, the more discriminable the 
sources. Based on where the evidence falls, relative to a decision criterion, 
participants choose one source over the other. This model, however, is only one-
dimensional, and must be expanded into a multivariate model in order to 
accurately describe data from combined item and source recognition tasks.  
 The multivariate, signal-detection model depicted in Figure 15 is an 
idealized model of several recent attempts to describe item and source recognition 
tasks, when there are two sources of information to be discriminated (e.g., 
Slotnick & Dodson, 2005; Starns et al., 2008). The model includes three bivariate 
normal distributions, one for Source A items, one for Source B items, and one for 
new items. The x-axis represents item strength, with strength increasing from left 
to right. As can be seen in the model, new items are further left on this dimension, 
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relative to Source A and B items, which do not differ from one another in the 
standard case. Source strength lies along the y-axis. In this model, source 
evidence favors either Source B (higher on the axis) or Source A (lower on the 
axis). New items are equidistant between Sources A and B, reflecting a lack of 
association to either source. As in signal-detection models, the evidence strength 
within each distribution is described by a Gaussian distribution, and would be 











Figure 15. The multivariate signal-detection model for item and source 
recognition (adapted from Starns et al., 2008). The ovals are cross-sections 
through hypothetical 3D distributions, where ‘strength’ lies on the z-axis. The 
solid horizontal and vertical lines represent possible response criteria for item 
(vertical) and source (horizontal) judgments. 
 
 As described by Starns and colleagues (2008), each of the ovals in Figure 
15 is centered at the mean of the distributions for item and source strength, and 
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can be thought of as a horizontal slice through the 3D distribution. The shapes of 
the distributions are contingent upon the correlation between values on the item 
and source dimensions. DeCarlo (2003) fit several data sets with this model, and 
observed no correlations for new items (as expected), but strong negative 
correlations for Source A items. That strong negative correlation indicated that as 
item strength increased, source evidence was lower on the source dimension (i.e., 
it favored Source A). Positive correlations were observed for Source B items. This 
relationship is why the contours for the Source A and B items are skewed down 
and up, respectively, and is consistent with the finding that accurate item 
recognition is associated with accurate source recognition (Glanzer et al., 2004).  
 Decisions are modeled within this framework by assuming multiple 
decision criteria, at least one for item recognition decisions and one for source 
judgments. The item recognition criterion is placed somewhere on the x-axis to 
optimize performance; as in signal-detection theory, as the criterion is shifted 
leftward, responding becomes more liberal. As in Starns et al. (2008), this is 
hypothetically represented within the figure by λI_lib and λI_con, for liberal and 
conservative criteria, respectively. Another decision criterion is adopted for the 
source judgment. This criterion (λS) is placed along the y-axis; values above it are 
judged Source B and below it are judged Source A. The method by which the 
model predicts source memory in absence of item memory is depicted by 
examining the regions of space that fall to the left of the item recognition criteria. 
Assuming a liberal response criterion, only a small portion of the Source A and B 
strength falls to the left of criterion, yielding “new” item responses and near-
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chance source responses. When the item recognition criterion is more 
conservative, however, the items are still called new, but the source dimensions 
are more differentiated, which should yield more accurate source recognition 
performance. Starns and colleagues (2008) manipulated participants’ response 
criteria by changing test instructions to indicate that either 25% or 75% of the 
items were old. Doing this, they observed data entirely consistent with their 
model. In fact, item response bias tended to be more conservative than liberal in 
the current experiments, which is consistent with the multivariate signal-detection 
explanation for accurate source memory in the absence of item memory.  
 To adapt this two-source model to fit the four-source data from the current 
experiments, additional dimensions would need to be described. In addition to the 
item recognition (x-axis) and strength (z-axis) dimensions, third and fourth 
dimensions (e.g., y1-axis for male sources and y2-axis for female sources, in the 
LS groups) would need to be added. Visually, this proves difficult, but 
conceptually, it is possible. By positing an extra dimension along which two other 
sources lie, the multivariate signal-detection model would provide a concise, but 
visually unappealing, model of the current data. No existing multinomial models 
are capable of describing source memory in the absence of item memory without 
incorporating fundamental changes. For example, Starns et al. (2008) discussed 
how multinomial models could be modified to predict source memory in the 
absence of item memory. Specifically, extant multinomial models would need to 
predict a third memory state. In addition to “detected” and “undetected” states, 
such models would need to incorporate an intermediate state of knowledge. This 
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modification, however, still subscribes to the notion of discrete states; it simply 
posits more of them. Models without discrete, threshold states more elegantly 
describe partial source recollection, and source recollection in the absence of item 
memory, two effects that clearly emerged in the present studies, and which are 
difficult to accommodate in standard dual-process models.
10
 
Research Aim 3: The Nature of Recognition Memory 
 
Klauer and Kellen (2010) recently called into question the utility of ROC 
analyses for adjudicating between models of memory. They suggested, for 
instance, that threshold models can predict curved ROCs if a plausible mapping 
function relates latent cognitive states to the rating scale. Further, when binary 
old/new decisions are used, discrete state models predict linear ROCs, but when 
confidence estimates are used, high-threshold models are able to predict curved 
ROCs (Malmberg, 2002). Although Klauer and Kellen (2010) recently compared 
the performance of several models in explaining ROCs from item and source 
memory judgments, none of the models that they considered were capable of 
explaining partial source recollection, or source recollection in the absence of 
item memory. (The models included a hybrid signal-detection model proposed by 
Hautus, Macmillan, and Rotello (2008), a variable-recollection dual-process 
model proposed by Onyper et al. (2010) and a new discrete-state model.) Because 
none of those models are capable of describing the current source monitoring 
                                                 
10 Note that Schutz and Broder (2011) recently provided evidence that high-threshold models (e.g., 
Bayen et al., 1996) and multivariate signal-detection models (e.g., DeCarlo, 2003) both adequately 
describe the data when model fits are considered without rating-based ROC analyses. The added 
value of multivariate signal-detection models over high-threshold models, however, is that signal-
detection based models predict partial source memory, and source memory in the absence of item 
memory. High-threshold models are unable to account for this finding. 
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data, they will not be considered as candidates for explaining the current ROC 
analyses. Rather, the ROC analyses from the current experiments will be 
explained by their conformity to the overarching theories of memory discussed 
earlier, single- and dual-process theories. ROC analyses are still one of the 
predominant methods by which to compare and contrast different models, and 
those in the present study collapsed across item and source recognition, consistent 
with the notion that they are based on the same underlying processes (as 
recommended by Klauer & Kellen, 2010) 
Overall, the pupillary ROC analyses provided evidence that was 
predominantly consistent with continuous models, and inconsistent with 
threshold-based models. Across all three experiments, the ROCs were 
consistently curvilinear, and the z-ROCs were predominantly linear. The shape-
based conclusions were backed up by subject-based ROC analyses. Whereas the 
quadratic constant for ROCs was always negative, and statistically different from 
zero, the same term in the z-ROC analyses was typically near zero (but reliably 
different from zero, given the number of data points fit), consistent with a linear 
function. Although the z-ROC was not as linear as a signal-detection model would 
predict, it was also not as curved as a dual-process account would predict. On the 
whole, the results are broadly consistent with single-process, signal-detection 
based views, which predict curved ROCs and linear z-ROCs. As summarized by 
Parks, Murray, Elfman, and Yonelinas (2011), dual-process theories predict 
strongly curvilinear z-ROCs during tasks that rely on recollection (e.g., source 
judgments); z-ROCs, they argue, should become more linear as familiarity plays a 
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greater role in source retrieval. Because the sources in the present experiment 
were equated for familiarity (e.g., they were used equally often), there was no 
reason why one source should have been more familiar than any other source.  
Although Yonelinas (1999) observed increases in the linearity of z-ROCs 
as familiarity increased, many studies have observed linear z-ROCs in the absence 
of manipulations intended to enhance the use of familiarity (e.g., Glanzer et al., 
2004; Qin et al., 2001; Slotnick et al., 2001). For example, Qin and colleagues 
(2001) presented participants with spoken statements for a source memory test 
and observed clearly linear z-ROCs. They argued that recollection must be behind 
accurate source memories, and that a continuous recollection process is 
responsible for the linearity. Further, they suggested that the apparent continuous 
nature of recollection was the direct result of the complexity of the material; 
previous studies, they argued, in which U-shaped z-ROCs were observed, used 
relatively simple materials that do not permit levels of recollected detail.  
Parks et al. (2011) recently examined this complexity explanation by using 
materials that varied in their level of complexity from relatively simple (auditory 
words) to complex (audiovisual sentences). By plotting source ROCs and z-
ROCs, Parks et al. observed that increases in the complexity of stimulus materials 
resulted in a curving of the source ROCs (and a concomitant flattening of the z-
ROCs), which proves to be difficult to explain under standard dual-process 
accounts. By making the assumption, however, that recollection is a threshold 
process, with strength characterized by a Gaussian distribution, Parks and 
colleagues were able to rectify curvilinear source ROCs and linear z-ROCs with 
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dual-process theory. This modified model, the variable recollection dual-process 
(VRDP) model (Sherman, Atri, Hasselmo, Stern, & Howard, 2003; for similar 
models, see DeCarlo, 2003; Kelley & Wixted, 2001; Onyper, Zhang, & Howard, 
2010) assumes that recollection is characterized by gradations in strength that fall 
above the threshold for simple materials and around the threshold for complicated 
materials. With simple materials, high-confidence responses reflect threshold 
recollection processes, but with complex materials, relatively high-confidence 
responses (e.g., 5 or 6) can be associated with recollection. This does not mean 
that recollection is a graded decision process; the decision process is still 
categorical, with familiarity queried as a backup (Parks et al., 2008; Yonelinas, 
1994). In essence, the effect of increases in complexity causes the recollection 
strength to be weaker and more variable.  
 This argument is similar to that provided for the effects of feature overlap 
(e.g., stimuli consisting of all suburban houses, which share many features). 
Elfman, Parks, and Yonelinas (2008) appealed to the complementary learning 
systems model (CLS; Norman & O’Reilly, 2003) to explain the finding that 
stimuli with high feature overlap yield curved ROCs (and linear z-ROCs). CLS is 
a biologically plausible model of the functions of medial temporal lobe (MTL) 
systems in encoding and retrieval. According to this model, the hippocampus 
encodes items using a fast pattern separation process; it is also the sole supporter 
of recollection. Other areas within the MTL (e.g., parahippocampal cortices) 
support the backup process, familiarity. When an item is presented for retrieval, 
the hippocampus first responds by initiating a pattern completion process, filling 
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in the item with stored traces. A recollection decision is then made by determining 
whether the pattern completion process surpassed threshold. If not, then 
familiarity processes are consulted. According to Elfman et al. (2008), this model 
can explain the effect of feature overlap by assuming that high feature overlap 
yields a slower, more graded pattern completion process during retrieval. The 
same type of explanation was invoked by Parks et al. (2011) to explain the effects 
of complexity: Recollection, in the model, was still a threshold process, but it was 
characterized by a wider Gaussian distribution, which resembles a continuous 
process.  
 Although these models are capable of predicting the ROC results 
described here, they are incapable of fully explaining the observed pattern of data. 
Specifically, VRDP, DPSD, and CLS do not incorporate any method by which 
source information, whether specific or partial, can be retrieved in the absence of 
item memory. Each of those models considers recollection to be a threshold 
process, associated with the highest level(s) of confidence. The data presented 
here argue firmly against that prediction. Even in situations known to produce low 
levels of confidence (i.e., item misses), participants were still able to retrieve 
enough source information to support specific or partial source recollection. 
Further, these data were observed with clearly curvilinear ROCs and linear z-
ROCs. Taken together, the behavioral and ROC data do not suggest that 
recollection is a threshold process. Rather, they suggest a graded, continuous 
recollection process.  
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 The last method by which dual-process and threshold theories attempt to 
explain the pattern of ROC results observed here is by positing the existence of 
“unitized familiarity” and suggesting that this supports source retrieval. As 
described earlier, unitization reflects the combination of item and source material 
into a single unit, such that the source becomes a feature of the item, rather than 
an episodic detail associated with the item. Accurate recollection of details, 
therefore, can theoretically be based on a graded unitized familiarity process, and 
not necessarily on recollection, which is typically assumed to be a threshold 
process. Although unitized familiarity is typically used to explain ROC data in 
associative recognition tasks, source memory tasks are equally recollection-based, 
and the predictions of unitized familiarity have been extended to the source 
memory literature (see Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2008, 2010). Diana and 
colleagues discuss the reality of unitized familiarity largely on the basis of 
neuroimaging results showing that the hippocampus and parahippocampus are 
active during successful encoding and retrieval of source memories (Davachi, 
Mitchell, & Wagner, 2003; Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Ranganath et al., 2003), 
whereas the perirhinal cortex is active for familiarity-based memories, but not 
with source memories (see Davachi et al., 2003; Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; 
Uncapher, Otten, & Rugg, 2006; Weis et al., 2004). Yonelinas, Kroll, Dobbins, 
and Soltani (1999) had earlier described encoding procedures that promote 
unitization, such as asking participants to make color-word associations by 
imagining the object described by the word in the color in which it was written 
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(the most common example is the word ‘elephant’ written in red font, yielding a 
red elephant).  
 One of the most highly-cited neuroimaging results relevant to the concept 
of unitized familiarity is that of Staresina and Davachi (2006). Participants in their 
study encoded words printed on one of four background colors; their task was to 
imagine that item in the arbitrary color of the background, a procedure known to 
promote unitization (particularly when the color is plausible for the item). Their 
results revealed that, contrary to other source memory findings, the perirhinal 
cortex was active during source (background color) retrieval. They concluded that 
the perirhinal cortex supported associative processing of intra-item details. If item 
and source details become unitized into a single episodic trace, then it is possible 
that source retrieval tasks can yield curvilinear ROCs based on unitized 
familiarity, without detriment to the threshold recollection assumption inherent to 
dual-process models. 
 Recent evidence suggests that item and source information can be 
processed in such a way as to promote unitization, yielding linear z-ROCs that are 
still consistent with dual-process theories (e.g., Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 
2008; Quamme. Yonelinas, & Norman, 2007; Yonelinas et al., 1999). For 
example, participants in Diana et al.’s study encoded words and colors under 
conditions that either promoted unitization (i.e., rating the plausibility of the item 
in the background color) or did not (i.e., making pleasantness rating or size 
judgments depending on the background color). As predicted, they observed that 
increasing the contribution of familiarity to the source judgment task (e.g., via 
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unitization) increased the curvilinearity of the source ROCs, and also increased 
familiarity estimates from DPSD. From this, the authors concluded that 
discrepancies in neural and ROC data from source memory tasks may be 
explainable by appealing to unitized familiarity, and not by abandoning the 
threshold recollection assumption in many dual-process theories. They also 
concluded that source recognition tasks are not process-pure measures of 
recollection, and on this latter point, there is wide agreement.  
 Although unitized familiarity provides a plausible account for the finding 
of curvilinear ROCs, the present studies included no manipulations or encoding 
procedures to promote unitization. In fact, the assignment of items to sources to 
retrieval cues was entirely random. If unitized familiarity were to play a role in 
explaining the ROC data reported here, one would have to assume that 
participants spontaneously unitized the voice and word information during 
encoding, which is a bit of a logical stretch. Further, Mickes, Johnson, and Wixted 
(2010) recently demonstrated that the concept of unitized familiarity is highly 
associated with recollective processes, including remember/know and unexpected 
cued recall. A more reasonable dual-process account for the current data would 
seem to appeal to the complexity of the stimulus materials. As reviewed by Parks 
et al. (2011), highly complex material is more likely to yield curvilinear ROCs. 
 But how complex is complex enough to yield curved ROCs that are still 
compatible with dual-process theories? Parks and colleagues (2011) suggested 
that single words, presented auditorily, yield the standard dual-process prediction 
of linear ROCs (and curved z-ROCs). It is only when the material was 
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audiovisual, and expanded to full sentences, that the recollection process “broke 
down” and became more graded, yielding curved ROCs (and linear z-ROCs). It is 
arguable that the present stimuli fell somewhere in between these two extremes, 
and were instead “somewhat complex.” Because of the many methods proposed 
to explain discrepant findings within dual-process theory (e.g., complexity, 
unitized familiarity, variable recollection), a more parsimonious explanation is 
simply that participants are able to recollect to varying degrees, consistent with 
the predictions of signal-detection models (e.g., UVSD or CDP). Whereas dual-
process theories propose different mechanisms based on the quality of the stimuli 
or task demands, signal-detection views offer a simple, straightforward account of 
episodic memory: Memory strength is always present, but is often not strong 
enough to support detailed recollection, instead yielding less detailed memories. 
Critically, this means that recognition can occur along various points of 
confidence, or strength, which would reveal ROCs exactly as observed in the 
present study. Future work will focus on the utility of pupillary ROCs, above and 
beyond those based on confidence estimates, by using manipulations known to 
influence memory strength and the shape of the curve.  
Research Aim 4: The Functional Role of Eye Movements 
 
 Lastly, one of the major goals of the present research was to determine 
whether, and to what extent, eye movements are reinstated across encoding and 
retrieval. Earlier work established a clear link between non-visually guided 
patterns (NVGPs) of eye movements and long-term memory retrieval (see 
Ehrlichman & Micic, 2012, for a review). For example, when retrieving more 
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difficult information from long-term memory, spontaneous saccadic eye 
movements are more frequent, relative to when retrieving easier information, or 
information from working memory (Ehrlichman et al., 2007; Micic et al., 2010). 
Research on NVGPs, however, has been silent on whether or not these eye 
movements were functional for memory, or whether they reflected reinstatements 
of eye movements from encoding.  
 Research on saccadic reinstatement has documented many cases in which 
eye movement patterns were reinstated across encoding and retrieval (e.g., 
Ballard, Hayhoe, & Pelz, 1995; Holm & Mäntylä, 2006; Richardson & Spivey, 
2000; Ryan, Hannula, & Cohen, 2007; Spivey & Geng, 2000; Yarbus, 1967, as 
cited in Tatler et al., 2010). In most of these studies, eye movement patterns were 
reinstated, but unrelated to improvements in memory retrieval. For example, 
Johannson, Holsanova, Dewhurst, and Holmqvist (2011) restricted participants’ 
eye movements during the encoding of auditory and visual information. Although 
this impaired memory relative to a free-viewing encoding condition, participants 
did not reinstate the single-fixations when allowed to move their eyes at retrieval. 
From this, they concluded that eye movements at retrieval are not reinstatements 
of those from encoding. This is inconsistent with their earlier findings, in which 
they observed that participants spontaneously move their eyes to previously-
viewed locations (now blank) during memory retrieval (Johansson, Holsanova, & 
Holmqvist, 2006) and with other findings in which participants spontaneously 
reinstated single fixations from restricted-viewing encoding conditions (Laeng & 
Teodorescu, 2002). Johansson et al. (2011) did, however observe that restricting 
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eye movements at retrieval had a detrimental effect on performance. When 
participants were not allowed to freely move their eyes during the recall of a 
previously-viewed scene, their recall performance became less detailed, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. This finding, they suggested, demonstrated that 
eye movements are not purely epiphenomenal, and that spontaneously reinstated 
eye movements have a functional role for memory retrieval (see also Holm & 
Mäntylä, 2006; Mäntylä & Holm, 2007). 
 In the current studies, eye movements were manipulated across encoding 
and retrieval in order to determine whether reinstated (or disrupted) eye 
movements have a facilitative (or detrimental) role in memory retrieval. 
Experiment 1 produced the most reliable results. Specifically, participants 
spontaneously reinstated eye movements to former regions of interest during 
memory retrieval (when the screen contained no visual information other than an 
empty 9-box grid) above chance-levels of fixations. Further, spontaneously 
reinstated eye movements were associated with more accurate source memories 
and faster item and source judgments. Externally-cueing participants to reinstate 
either single fixations (Experiment 2) or full eye-movement patterns (Experiment 
3) did not facilitate retrieval. In fact, there was a trend for item d’ to decrease 
across the three experiments (see Figure 16). Although this trend was not reliable, 
F(2, 176) = 1.02, p = .36, it clearly depicts that d’, despite already being quite 
low, decreased as the participants’ eye movements were more manipulated. 
 
 









Figure 16. Average d'  across Experiments 1, 2, and 3. Error bars represent 
standard error of the mean.  
 
Upon first consideration, the eye movement results are consistent with 
those of Holm and Mäntylä (2006; Mäntylä & Holm, 2007), who observed that 
reinstated eye movements were associated with increases in remember responses 
in the RK procedure. Although there are many differences between the two tasks, 
researchers have often likened source retrieval to R responses (e.g., Conway & 
Dewhurst, 1995). The rationale is that source retrieval typically involves 
recollection (but see the discussion of unitized familiarity, above), and that 
participants are often able to report the subjective quality of their memories, using 
“remember” to index some degree of recollection. Further, despite the dual-
process assumption that recollection is slow and effortful, R responses are 
typically fast and accurate, a qualitative pattern replicated here during accurate 
source memories that were also characterized by high rates of reinstated eye 
movements. Inconsistent with this, however, was the relationship between low 
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rates of reinstated eye movements and the speed with which participants made 
item and source judgments. Specifically, the RT patterns for very low 
reinstatement rates mirrored that for very high reinstatement rates; they were both 
very fast, relative to mid-level reinstatement rates. Although the directionality of 
this relationship is unclear (i.e., based on the pattern of results, it is impossible to 
determine whether the effect is facilitative or detrimental), it certainly suggests 
some benefit for memory retrieval based on oculomotor reinstatement. Curiously, 
the pattern suggests that the memory processes in trials with very low and very 
high rates of refixations are the same (or at least similar), and that another process 
or strategy was engaged during the mid-level rates. Although it is tempting to 
relate these processes to familiarity (typically assumed to be fast and automatic) 
and recollection (typically assumed to be slow and effortful), that conclusion may 
be a bit premature. For instance, very high rates of refixations were associated 
with both faster RTs and more accurate source judgments. As described earlier, 
typical conceptualizations of recollection cannot explain a fast recollection 
process; rather, dual-process theorists would need to appeal to a fast unitized 
familiarity process to explain this result. As discussed above, the current 
experiments did not encourage unitization processes, making this interpretation 
speculative, at best. 
 So how do very low and very high rates of refixations result in the same, 
relatively speeded, RTs? I suggest that the results reflect one basic memory 
process, characterized by its strength of evidence (similar to the multivariate 
signal-detection models discussed above, see Starns et al., 2008), but 
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differentiated based on its spread of activation to associated details. As Ferreira et 
al. (2008) suggested, eye movements are part of a rich, detailed encoding trace, 
and activating one part of this trace will typically activate other parts of the trace. 
For example, when presented with a test item, participants often spontaneously 
engage in the oculomotor behaviors associated with that item. Strong memories, 
as discussed above, typically result in fast decisions. The data reported here 
suggest that these fast decisions do not always contain the same level of detail. 
When presented with a test item, the resulting item memory strength could be 
very strong, yet undifferentiated, and still yield a fast decision. On the other hand, 
the memory could be very strong, and differentiated, and also yield a fast 
decision. The difference between the two types of memory lies in the amount of 
details they contain. Whereas one memory is fast, and lacks associated detail 
(yielding low rates of refixations and low source accuracy), the other memory is 
also fast, but contains rich details (yielding high rates of refixations and higher 
source accuracy). The data from Experiment 1 were consistent with this 
interpretation: When participants were able to retrieve source details, they were 
also more likely to reinstate their encoding fixations.  
 A more thorough account of the data, however, should attempt to explain 
the reliable findings from Experiment 1 within the context of the null results in 
Experiments 2 and 3. Although it is ill-advised to draw conclusions from null 
results, the spectacular lack of effects cannot be ignored (see below for future 
directions that might provide more incisive tests about the role of eye movements 
in memory retrieval). Recall that the present work was motivated, in part, by the 
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anecdotal distinction between remembering (clearly recognizing a coworker at the 
mall) and knowing (knowing that you know that coworker, in the absence of any 
qualitative details), Mandler’s (1980) ‘butcher on the bus’ phenomenon. The 
former type of memory is what Tulving (1983) had in mind when he coined the 
term “episodic memory;” episodic memories are memories that involve some 
degree of episodic detail, such as recognizing spatiotemporal context. These 
memories are distinct from implicit memories, which can be observed when prior 
exposure influences future behavior in the absence of overt awareness of the prior 
exposure (Graf & Schacter, 1985). In fact, Schacter and Tulving (1994) suggested 
that implicit memory phenomena reflect the function of knowledge (perceptual or 
semantic), whereas explicit memory phenomena reflect episodic retrieval. 
Evidence for the separability of implicit and explicit memory systems is often 
observed in empirical dissociations (see Roediger & McDermott, 1993) and 
neuroanatomical dissociations (e.g., Graf & Schacter, 1985; Warrington & 
Weiskrantz, 1968). In priming studies, amnesics, for instance, and patients with 
hippocampal lesions typically show intact implicit memory, but faulty explicit 
memory. 
 Priming studies are truly the paradigm case for the existence of implicit 
memory; if implicit and explicit memory are truly separate memory systems, then 
the reinstatement or alteration of episodic details should have no effect on 
priming. Empirically, however, several researchers have observed large episodic 
effects in implicit memory. For example, in perceptual implicit priming studies, 
priming is reduced when the typeface of words changes across the prime and the 
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target (see Tenpenny, 1995, for a review). Unless some episodic detail is retained 
in the implicit memory trace for the primed item, there should be no reason for 
typeface to influence performance. McKone and French (2001) discussed multiple 
meanings of the term episodic, and how episodic-like effects in implicit memory 
may be explained by appealing to different definitions. They described three 
meanings, the first of which is that episodic memories make autobiographical 
reference to one’s past (something amnesic patients, discussed above, cannot do). 
The second is that episodes code the “intrinsic context” of an item, including the 
properties that are unavoidably processed while performing the task. For example, 
during visual word priming, the intrinsic context contains visual processes, 
orthographic identification, phonological processing, etc. Using this definition of 
“episodic” explains why priming studies demonstrate episodic effects. The third 
definition is that episodes code “extrinsic context,” which consists of information 
processed during the task, but which is not vital to completing the task (e.g., time 
of day, environmental context, mood, etc.). Changes in extrinsic context underlie 
classic demonstrations of context-based memory retrieval (e.g., Godden & 
Baddeley, 1975, see Smith & Vela, 2001, for a review), but have been 
inconsistently linked to differences in implicit memory performance (see Jacoby, 
1983; McKone & French, 2001; Mulligan, 2011; Parker, Dagnall, & Coyle, 2007; 
Parker, Gellatly, & Waterman, 1999; Smith, Heath, & Vela, 1990). 
 Based on these definitions, the eye movement manipulations in the present 
research were intended to foster intrinsic context-based memory effects, 
consistent with McKone and French’s (2001) second definition. To date, little 
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research has examined the influence of intrinsic context reinstatement on episodic 
or implicit memory. In the present study, the external environment remained the 
same throughout testing and any mood-based changes over the brief course of the 
experiment were expected to be minimal (i.e., extrinsic context was constant). 
Rather, in Experiment 1, participants’ own eye movements at retrieval were 
expected to reveal intrinsic context reinstatement. To some degree, they did, as 
reinstated eye movements were associated with better source memory and faster 
evidence accumulation. Experiments 2 and 3 involved external-cues to prior 
intrinsically-relevant (or irrelevant) states, with little success. Cueing previously-
viewed locations or entire sequences of prior eye movements had no effect on 
participants’ episodic memory performance (and, in fact, created a negative 
trend).  
One potential explanation for the finding that externally-cued intrinsic 
contexts failed to influence episodic memory could be that intrinsic context 
effects act upon implicit memory. In the literature on eye movements in memory, 
one key finding supports this possibility: Amnesics, who have explicit memory 
deficits, but intact implicit memory, demonstrate reliable eye movement-based 
memory effects in studies of face and scene processing (e.g., Ryan et al., 2000; 
but see Smith & Squire, 2008). Laeng and colleagues (2007) observed that 
amnesic patients, despite being unable to retrieve new semantic facts from 
episodic memory, nevertheless reinstated the eye fixations that were executed 
during the encoding of those facts. By contrast, eye movement studies of amnesic 
patients’ relational memory (which relies upon hippocampal processes, like 
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recollection-, or detail-, based memories) demonstrate no such eye-movement-
based effects. Whereas neurologically intact controls fixate on the locations of 
changes in visual scenes, even in the absence of awareness of the change, amnesic 
patients show no such effect (Hannula et al., 2007; Ryan et al., 2007; Ryan et al., 
2000). Although eye movement-based memory effects are predicted by 
hippocampal activity during relational memory tasks (Hannula & Ranganath, 
2009), their existence in patients with hippocampal amnesia suggests that their 
locus resides in the implicit memory system (or, alternatively, that the 
hippocampus selectively supports relational processing, as their studies were 
designed specifically to reveal that). Because the present study was episodic in 
nature, it is likely that effects of implicit memory were overshadowed by the 
episodic demands of the task. Had the task involved an implicit measure of 
memory, such as stem-completion, intrinsic context effects would have been more 
likely to emerge. Future work will adopt this approach, in order to determine 
whether intrinsic context, as operationalized via eye movements, influence 
implicit or explicit memory processes.  
 Finally, the present results add to the growing, and somewhat inconsistent, 
body of research on the putatively functional role of eye movements across 
learning and retrieval. Abundant evidence suggests that eye movements play no 
functional role in memory processes, and are better described by appeals to 
spatial indexing, whereby spatiotemporal information is linked to internal 
representations in order to offload from working memory (e.g., Richardson & 
Kirkham, 2004; Richardson & Spivey, 2000; Ballard et al., 1997). Such an 
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explanation falls directly in line with O’Regan’s (1990) concept of the world as 
an external memory store. Although variants of this theory do not necessarily 
subscribe to the notion that an external memory store precludes the existence of 
an internal memory store, proponents tend to remain agnostic as to whether such 
an internal store is necessary (e.g., Richardson et al., 2009).  
 On the other hand, several researchers have found evidence to suggest that 
eye movements, while not necessarily reinstatements of those from encoding 
(e.g., Johansson et al., 2011), are functional for memory retrieval (Ferreira et al., 
2008; Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002). These findings suggest that integrated 
memory representations are derived from perceptual and linguistic experience, 
and that such memory representations are reactivated upon retrieval. If eye 
movements are one of the components of this rich memory trace, then a retrieval 
cue that sufficiently activates the trace should also activate the eye movement 
pattern. This account is consistent with Kent and Lamberts’ (2008) notion of 
memory retrieval as mental simulation, by which they argue that encoding-
retrieval interactions (e.g., transfer-appropriate processing, encoding specificity, 
etc.) reflect the ability of the cognitive system to manipulate internal 
representations while relying upon the perceptual processes that were engaged 
during encoding (note that this viewpoint is consistent with those of Kolers and 
Roediger, 1984, or Barsalou, 1999). Several recent memory theories make similar 
claims regarding the necessity of contextual and perceptual information from the 
environment (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Ferreira et al., 2008; Glenberg, 1997; Rubin, 
2006). In fact, Barsalou’s (1999, 2008) perceptual symbol systems theory directly 
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assumes that when participants are asked about information in memory, they 
engage in a ‘mental simulation’ on the relevant symbols.  
 Kent and Lamberts (2008) described two types of mental simulations 
capable of supporting cognitive processes relevant to memory retrieval. The first 
type are ‘explicit simulations,’ or simulations that are based on retrieval from 
episodic memory. During explicit simulations, mental operations work upon the 
perceptual symbols that were present during encoding, and give rise to feelings of 
recollection (as in autobiographical memory, e.g., Conway, Pleydell-Pearce, 
Whitecross, & Sharpe, 2002). The second type are implicit, or unconscious, 
simulations, which are activated during implicit memory tasks and do not rely 
upon retrieval of episodic detail. The major qualitative difference between the two 
types of simulation is that they result in two different experiences of memory. 
This is perhaps because they rely upon different mechanisms that act upon the 
same perceptual symbols (Barsalou, 2008), or because the “format” of the 
information differs across the two forms of information (Hegarty, 2004). Given 
the dissociations between implicit and explicit memory discussed above, it seems 
more likely that, if one assumes that mental simulations support cognitive 
processes, the content of those simulations should differ across episodic and 
implicit memory. Because implicit memories are generally impervious to changes 
in external context, it is sensible to assume that the mental simulations underlying 
those memories do not contain the relevant extrinsic detail. 
 To support their theory of mental simulations, Kent and Lamberts (2008) 
described myriad neuropsychological demonstrations of encoding-retrieval 
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‘matches’ in brain activity (e.g., Goldberg, Perfetti, & Schneider, 2006; Otten, 
2007; Simmons et al., 2007), suggesting that the processes that support successful 
encoding are also recruited during retrieval. They also appealed to many of the 
eye movement studies discussed above. Specifically, they cited evidence from 
Laeng and Teodorescu (2002), Mäntylä and Holm (2006; Holm & Mäntylä, 
2008), and Johannson et al. (2006) suggesting that eye movements play a 
functional role in memory processing. For example, Tremblay et al. (2006) 
observed improved recall ability in participants who spontaneously engaged in 
rehearsal-like eye movements following encoding of visual-spatial material. The 
results from the present study, and the demonstrations from Richardson and 
colleagues (Hoover & Richardson, 2008; Richardson & Spivey, 2000; Spivey & 
Geng, 2002) offer conflicting views. Specifically, eye movements, and reinstated 
eye movements, are not consistently associated with improvements in memory 
performance. This finding is in stark contrast to Kent and Lamberts’ (2008, p.95) 
prediction that “sensory-motor encoding procedures…can aid retrieval when they 
are re-enacted.” The current results demonstrate that externally cueing the re-
enactment of encoding procedures does not facilitate memory, and Richardson 
and Spivey (2000) observed no effect of reinstated eye movements on retrieval 
success. Although it can be argued that the lack of relationship between eye 
movement patterns and retrieval success in the present and above-mentioned 
studies reflects the fact that none of the studies directly tapped visuospatial 
memory information, if memory traces are mental simulations of the encoding 
event, some defined relationship would be expected to emerge. In fact, Godijn 
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and Theeuwes (2012) observed disruptive effects of cued eye movements on 
retrieval from working memory, similar to the pattern observed in d' across the 
three experiments reported here. This does not, however, rule out the possibility 
that maintaining unnatural fixations is a cognitively demanding task in and of 
itself, one which draws resources away from the primary task. Future research 
will focus on the role of reinstated eye movements using a three-phase memory 
procedure (e.g., Jacoby et al., 2005). Using this procedure, one can document the 
degree to which participants naturally reinstate eye movements at Test 1 and use 
it to predict memory performance on Test 2. Clearly, there is much work to be 
done to determine the role of eye movements in memory retrieval. 
General Conclusions 
 The present research revealed new insights in episodic memory, and the 
role of eye movements in retrieval from episodic memory. In contrast to dual-
process theories, or theories that posit a threshold recollection process, episodic 
memory appears to be characterized by a graded continuum of memory strength. 
The finding of partial source recollection, and of source retrieval in the absence of 
item memory, strongly suggests that people do not rely upon categorical either/or 
memory processes, even when those memories should be based on recollective 
processes. Consistent evidence was observed via pupillary ROC and z-ROC 
analyses. Whereas dual-process theories predict curvilinear ROCs and linear z-
ROCs, signal-detection views predict the reverse, which was the pattern 
consistently observed here. Lastly, eye movements appear to have a role in 
retrieval processes, as they are spontaneously reinstated during retrieval, but it is 
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possible (and likely) that those eye movements better describe the function of 
implicit, relative to episodic, memory. Taken together, the results support a 
multivariate signal-detection view of recognition memory, with rich, detailed 
memory traces capable of integrating rich details consisting of visual, spatial, 
temporal, and motoric properties.  
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                      Low-Frequency                       High-Frequency 
  acid   hose   act   head 
  apple   leaf   also   heart 
arm   lick   bad   help 
beak   locker   bed   hope 
bear   minor   beer   house 
belt   mute   big   key 
bib   pan   blood   leave 
boar   panda   boat   like 
boot   pat   book   made 
branch  peas   boss   man 
brood   pot   box   middle 
bug   raid   boy   mind 
cane   rake   card   nose 
cat   rose   care   paper 
cord   rye   church   pay 
dangle  saddle   coffee   phone 
deaf   scale   day   plane 
dime   scope   doctor   ring 
dish   sew   dog   safe 
dud   shape   door   saw 
egg   shark   evil   show 
fad   sheep   eye   simple 
fame   sink   face   sleep 
fence   skill   fat   start 
folder   skirt   father   stay 
fox   skunk   feel   stick 
glean   slot   fish   still 
hag   spider   force   strong 
harp   sprang   found   table 
haste   stew   gun   truck 
hat   toffee   hair   watch 
haunt   wink   hand   week 
hive   witch   handle   wife 
hoop   wood   hate   woman  
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Low-Similarity Condition 1 
 
  True              Response 
Source “Art”           “Chloe”           “Erik”              “Whitney”           “New” 
Art  109                  70       75       64   222 
Chloe    39         109       91       81   220 
Erik    49            65     137       64   225  
Whitney    59             65       76     128     212 
New    61           67       89       75   588 
 
Low-Similarity Condition 2 
 
  True              Response 
Source               “Anne”               “Don”               “Emma”            “Steve”           “New” 
Anne  100                  44       36       45   155 
Don    49             76       36       41   178 
Emma    41            57       74       34   174  
Steve    34            60       38       75     173 
New    54            63       54       89   351 
 
High-Similarity Condition 1 
 
  True              Response 
Source “Art”              “Don”             “Erik”                “Steve”            “New” 
Art    83                  66       81       64   226 
Don    70             92       76       66   216 
Erik    59            69     106       52   234  
Steve    58            71       95       75     221 
New    70             74     115       64   437 
 
High-Similarity Condition 2 
 
  True              Response 
Source               “Anne”             “Chloe”            “Emma”          “Whitney”           “New” 
Anne    79                  49       57       70   225 
Chloe    59            61       53       64   243 
Emma    83            50       73       52   222  
Whitney    47            55       64       77     237 
New    63           57       72       80   448 
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FREQUENCY TABLE PERCENTAGES, EXPERIMENT 1 
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Low-Similarity Condition 1 
 
  True              Response 
Source “Art”           “Chloe”               “Erik”           “Whitney”           “New” 
Art  20.18           12.96    13.88    11.85  40.79 
Chloe    7.22           20.19    16.85    15.00  57.89 
Erik    9.07           12.04    25.37    11.85  59.21 
Whitney  10.93           12.04    14.07    23.70  55.79 
New    6.93             7.61    10.11      8.50  66.82 
 
Low-Similarity Condition 2 
 
  True              Response 
Source                   “Anne”         “Don”               “Emma”             “Steve”             “New” 
Anne  26.32           11.58      9.47    11.84  40.79 
Don  12.89           20.00      9.47    10.79  46.84 
Emma  10.79           15.00    19.47      8.95  45.79 
Steve    8.95           15.79    10.00    19.74  45.53 
New    8.83           10.31      8.83    14.56  57.44 
 
High-Similarity Condition 1 
 
  True              Response 
Source “Art”            “Don”                “Erik”              “Steve”              “New” 
Art  15.96           12.69    15.58    12.31  43.46 
Don  13.46           17.69    14.62    12.69  41.54 
Erik  11.35           13.27    20.38    10.00  45.00 
Steve  11.35           13.65    18.27    14.42  42.50 
New    9.21             9.74    15.13      8.42  57.50 
 
High-Similarity Condition 2 
 
  True              Response 
Source                   “Anne”        “Chloe”               “Emma”         “Whitney”          “New” 
Anne  15.19             9.42    10.96    13.46  43.27 
Chloe  11.35           11.73    10.19    12.31  46.73 
Emma  15.96             9.62    14.04    10.00  42.69 
Whitney    9.04           10.58    12.31    14.81  42.69 
New    8.75             7.92    10.00    11.11  62.22 
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Source-specific identification score (item correct): 
 
(P(“A”|A) + P(“D”|D) + P(“C”|C) + P(“W”|W)) 
         (((1 – P(“N”|A)) + ((1 – P(“N”|D)) + ((1 – P(“N”|C)) + ((1 – P(“N”|W))) 
 
Partial-source identification score (item correct): 
 
(P(“D”|A) + P(“A”|D) + P(“W”|C) + P(“C”|W)) – (.5 * (P(“C”|A) + P(“W”|A) + 
P(“C”|D) + P(“W”|D) + P(“A”|C) + P(“D”|C) + P(“A”|W) + P(“D”|W))) 
((1 – P(“A”|A) – P(“N”|A)) + ((1 – P(“D”|D) – P(“N”|D)) + ((1 – P(“C”|C) – 
P(“N”|C)) + ((1 – P(“W”|W) – P(“N”|W)) 
 
Source-specific identification score (item incorrect): 
 
(P(“A”|A) + P(“D”|D) + P(“C”|C) + P(“W”|W)) 
         (P(“D”|A) + P(“A”|D) + P(“W”|C) + P(“C”|W)) + P(“C”|A) + P(“W”|A) + 
P(“C”|D) + P(“W”|D) + P(“A”|C) + P(“D”|C) + P(“A”|W) + P(“D”|W))) 
 
 
Partial-source identification score (item incorrect): 
 
(P(“D”|A) + P(“A”|D) + P(“W”|C) + P(“C”|W)) – (.5 * (P(“C”|A) + P(“W”|A) + 
P(“C”|D) + P(“W”|D) + P(“A”|C) + P(“D”|C) + P(“A”|W) + P(“D”|W))) 
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ROC DATA, EXPERIMENT 1 
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Response Frequencies: HS Groups 
 Very sure new            Very sure old 
  1               2               3               4               5               6               ∑ 
Old            175   285      488        1175 430     487        3040 
New                242   209      583          229  149     108        1520 
 
Response Frequencies: LS Groups 
 Very sure new            Very sure old 
  1               2               3               4               5               6               ∑ 
Old            108   140      261          635  273     263        1680 




Cumulative Response Proportions: HS Groups 
 Very sure new            Very sure old 
  1               2               3               4               5               6                
Old            1.00   0.94      0.85         0.69 0.30     0.16         
New                1.00   0.84      0.70         0.32  0.17     0.07         
 
Cumulative Response Proportions: LS Groups 
 Very sure new            Very sure old 
  1               2               3               4               5               6                
Old            1.00   0.94      0.85          0.70  0.32     0.16         




z-Scores: HS Groups 
 Very sure new            Very sure old 
  1               2               3               4               5               6                
Old            3.09   1.55      0.99         0.47          -0.52   -0.99         
New                3.09   0.99      0.52        -0.50          -0.99   -1.47         
 
z-Scores: LS Groups 
 Very sure new            Very sure old 
  1               2               3               4               5               6                
Old            3.09   1.47      1.04         0.49          -0.49   -1.04         
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FREQUENCY TABLES, EXPERIMENT 2 
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Low-Similarity Condition 1 
 
  True              Response 
Source “Art”              “Chloe”           “Erik”          “Whitney”            “New” 
Art    34                  33                 36     28   109 
Chloe    27            23                 34     42   114 
Erik    24             23                 48     40   105  
Whitney    39            23                 48     40     105 
New    50           31     49     62   288 
 
Low-Similarity Condition 2 
 
  True              Response 
Source                    “Anne”           “Don”          “Emma”             “Steve”              “New” 
Anne    70                  34     32     31     93 
Don    28             67     31     27   107 
Emma    38             22     58     30   112  
Steve    36             27     40     49     108 
New    40             52     45     43   340 
 
High-Similarity Condition 1 
 
  True              Response 
Source “Art”               “Don”            “Erik”               “Steve”             “New” 
Art    50                  24     36     29   121 
Don    34             45     43     22   116 
Erik    38             34     45     28   115  
Steve    20             35     49     43     113 
New    40             65     74     41   300 
 
High-Similarity Condition 2 
 
  True              Response 
Source                    “Anne”           “Chloe”        “Emma”           “Whitney”          “New” 
Anne    34                  14     19     19   114 
Chloe    27             31     17     25   100 
Emma    28             17     31     25     99  
Whitney    28             13     27     25     107 
New    41             27     41     34   257 
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FREQUENCY TABLE PERCENTAGES, EXPERIMENT 2 
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Low-Similarity Condition 1 
 
  True              Response 
Source “Art”           “Chloe”              “Erik”             “Whitney”         “New” 
Art  14.16           13.75    15.00    11.66  41.92 
Chloe  11.25             9.58    14.16    17.50  43.84 
Erik  10.00             9.58    20.00    16.66  40.38 
Whitney  16.25             9.58    12.08    23.75  35.38 
New  10.42             6.46    10.21    12.92  60.00 
 
Low-Similarity Condition 2 
 
  True              Response 
Source                    “Anne”        “Don”               “Emma”             “Steve”            “New” 
Anne  26.92           13.07    12.31    11.92  35.77 
Don  10.77           25.77    11.92    10.38  41.15 
Emma  14.62             8.46    22.31               11.54  43.07 
Steve  13.85           10.38    15.38    18.85  41.54 
New    7.69           10.00      8.65      8.27  65.38 
 
High-Similarity Condition 1 
 
  True              Response 
Source “Art”            “Don”                 “Erik”              “Steve”            “New” 
Art  19.23             9.23    13.85    11.15   60.50 
Don  13.08           17.31    16.54      8.46  58.00 
Erik  14.62           13.07    17.31    10.77  57.50 
Steve    7.69           13.46    18.85    16.54  56.50 
New    7.69           12.50    14.23      7.88  57.69 
 
High-Similarity Condition 2 
 
  True              Response 
Source                    “Anne”       “Chloe”             “Emma”           “Whitney”          “New” 
Anne  17.00             7.00      9.50      9.50  57.00 
Chloe  13.50           15.50      8.50    12.50  50.00 
Emma  14.00             8.50    15.50    12.50  49.50 
Whitney  14.00             6.50      13.50    12.50  53.50 
New  10.25             6.75    10.25      8.50  64.25 
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ROC DATA, EXPERIMENT 2 
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Response Frequencies: HS Groups 
 Very sure new            Very sure old 
  1               2               3               4               5               6               ∑ 
Old              81   165      264          596 222     272        1600 
New                121   106      292          146    86       49          800 
 
Response Frequencies: LS Groups 
 Very sure new            Very sure old 
  1               2               3               4               5               6               ∑ 
Old             84   178      282          639  252     245        1680 




Cumulative Response Proportions: HS Groups 
 Very sure new            Very sure old 
  1               2               3               4               5               6                
Old            1.00   0.94      0.85         0.68 0.31     0.17         
New                1.00   0.85      0.72         0.35  0.17     0.06         
 
Cumulative Response Proportions: LS Groups 
 Very sure new            Very sure old 
  1               2               3               4               5               6                
Old            1.00   0.95      0.84          0.68  0.30     0.15         




z-Scores: HS Groups 
 Very sure new            Very sure old 
  1               2               3               4               5               6                
Old            3.09   1.55      0.99         0.47          -0.52   -0.95         
New                3.09   0.99      0.55        -0.39         -0.99   -1.55         
 
z-Scores: LS Groups 
 Very sure new            Very sure old 
  1               2               3               4               5               6                
Old            3.09   1.65      0.99         0.44          -0.55   -1.08         
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FREQUENCY TABLES, EXPERIMENT 3 
  
  165 
 
Low-Similarity Condition 1 
 
  True              Response 
Source “Art”           “Chloe”               “Erik”            “Whitney”         “New” 
Art    53                39       47       40   121 
Chloe    38           53       42       39   128 
Erik    42          26       57       40   135  
Whitney    31           23       50       63     133 
New    43           37       54       71   395 
 
Low-Similarity Condition 2 
 
  True              Response 
Source                   “Anne”         “Don”               “Emma”           “Steve”              “New” 
Anne    65                44       42       31   158 
Don    44           87       32       44   133 
Emma    39           53       58       36   154  
Steve    40           51       42       58     149 
New    72           69       66       54   419 
 
High-Similarity Condition 1 
 
  True              Response 
Source “Art”            “Don”                “Erik”             “Steve”              “New” 
Art    26                41       44       26   103 
Don    26           41       27       26   120 
Erik    31            32       44       19   114  
Steve    26           41       34       26     113 
New    49           63       65       37   266 
 
High-Similarity Condition 2 
 
  True              Response  
Source                “Anne”      “Chloe”             “Emma”          “Whitney”           “New” 
Anne    48                23       31       29   129 
Chloe    40           32       33       37   118 
Emma    34           17       45       36   128  
Whitney    37           24       27       53     119 
New    75           44       50       61   290 
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FREQUENCY TABLE PERCENTAGES, EXPERIMENT 3 
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Low-Similarity Condition 1 
 
  True              Response 
Source “Art”           “Chloe”               “Erik”           “Whitney”          “New” 
Art  17.66           13.00    15.66    13.33  40.33 
Chloe  12.66           17.66    14.00    13.00  42.66 
Erik  14.00             8.66    19.00    13.33  45.00 
Whitney  10.33             7.66    16.66    21.00  44.33 
New    7.16             6.16      9.00    11.83  65.83 
 
Low-Similarity Condition 2 
 
  True              Response 
Source                   “Anne”         “Don”               “Emma”             “Steve”            “New” 
Anne  19.12           12.94    12.35      9.12  46.47 
Don  12.94           25.58      9.41    12.94  39.12 
Emma  11.47           15.58    17.06                10.59  45.29 
Steve  11.76           15.00    12.35    17.06  43.82 
New  10.58           10.14      9.70      7.94  57.08 
 
High-Similarity Condition 1 
 
  True              Response 
Source “Art”            “Don”                “Erik”               “Steve”           “New” 
Art  10.83           17.08    18.83    10.83  42.92 
Don  10.83           17.08    11.25    10.83  50.00 
Erik  12.92           13.33    18.33      7.92  47.50 
Steve  10.83           17.08    14.12    10.83  47.08 
New  10.18           13.12    13.54      7.71  55.41 
 
High-Similarity Condition 2 
 
  True              Response 
Source                    “Anne”        “Chloe”             “Emma”          “Whitney”         “New” 
Anne  18.46             8.85    11.92    11.15  49.62 
Chloe  15.38           12.31    12.69    14.23  45.38 
Emma  13.08             6.54    17.31    13.85  49.23 
Whitney  14.23             9.23      10.38    20.38  45.77 
New  14.42             8.46      9.62    11.73  55.77 
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ROC DATA, EXPERIMENT 3 
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Response Frequencies: HS Groups 
 Very sure new            Very sure old 
  1               2               3               4               5               6               ∑ 
Old           114   203      343          727 277     336        2000 
New                149   155      394          148    95       59        1000 
 
Response Frequencies: LS Groups 
 Very sure new            Very sure old 
  1               2               3               4               5               6               ∑ 
Old            131   256      413          965  367     428        2560 




Cumulative Response Proportions: HS Groups 
 Very sure new            Very sure old 
  1               2               3               4               5               6                
Old            1.00   0.94      0.84         0.67 0.31     0.17         
New                1.00   0.85      0.70         0.30  0.15     0.06         
 
Cumulative Response Proportions: LS Groups 
 Very sure new            Very sure old 
  1               2               3               4               5               6                
Old            1.00   0.95      0.85          0.69  0.31     0.17         




z-Scores: HS Groups 
 Very sure new            Very sure old 
  1               2               3               4               5               6                
Old            3.09   1.55      0.99         0.44          -0.52   -0.99         
New                3.09   1.04      0.50        -0.52         -1.04   -1.65         
 
z-Scores: LS Groups 
 Very sure new            Very sure old 
  1               2               3               4               5               6                
Old            3.09   1.55      0.99         0.47          -0.50   -0.99         
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